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At the beginning of his Institutions of medicine William Cullen defined 
“ P h y s io l o g y , or the Doctrine of the Animal Oeconomy” as “the 
doctrine which explains the conditions of the body and of the mind 
necessary to life and health” .' Commenting on the same definition in his 
Edinburgh medical lectures in 1770, he noted that while physiologists 
normally discussed mental conditions it was not usual to include the 
mind in the definition of physiology. Some people had criticized him for 
introducing metaphysics into medicine. In response, Cullen employed a 
distinction which was also made by his friend David Hume, between two 
meanings of ‘metaphysics’. It can mean “subtile Disquisitions” : like 
Hume, he wanted to avoid metaphysics in this sense. However,
if by Metaphysics we understand as I think we should the Operations of the 
human Mind in thinking, that is, the History of the human Mind, then I say 
Metaphysics are unavoidable not only in Physick, but perhaps in every Science 
if a man goes deep.
True metaphysics for both thinkers was concerned with “the Mind and 
its Operations” . Cullen saw this as a particularly important study in 
medicine because “ it is not less certain that the Conditions of the Mind 
do mutually affect the Body” than that “the Conditions of the Body do 
affect the Mind” .^
In proposition 310! the Institutions Cullen adopted the view that there
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is an immaterial mind in a living man and that all thinking is a property of 
this alone. However, he also insisted that this soul or mind (he used the 
terms interchangeably) is closely connected with “the material and 
corporeal part” of man, in particular with the nervous system. While he 
accepted this connection as a fact, “the mode of it we do not understand, 
nor pretend to explain” . He would probably have included questions 
about how mind and body are interconnected among the false 
metaphysics which he rejected. At the end of his 1770-71 lecture on this 
proposition Cullen mentioned three philosophico-theological hypo­
theses about the nature of this connection—the ancient theory of 
“Physical Influx”, the doctrine of “occasional Causes” which he 
ascribed to Descartes, and the “pre-established Harmonies” theory of 
Leibniz. However, he said no more about these except that there are 
“Difficulties” with each (NLS Cullen, fols. 78-9). In his flnal course of 
lectures he stressed that none of these systems “have the least effect or 
inffuence in explaining anything. They do not either admit of any 
application in Physic, or in any part of science that I see.” The adoption 
of one or the other only affects “the business of religion” .^
Cullen had a very different attitude to the questions concerning the 
relation of mind and body raised by eighteenth-century physiologists, 
and discussed these at length in his lectures. They concerned the 
“degree and extent” of the mutual inffuence of soul and body, no matter 
what the soul may be. He noted that his predecessor Robert Whytt had 
“with great strength of argument shown that the Phenomena even of the 
body itself, cannot be explained, but upon the supposition of a Soul as 
. . .  a sensible principle” (NLM, II, fols. 25-7). Whytt had maintained 
that all life functions require a soul or mind. In An essay on the vital and 
other involuntary motions of animals he had formulated the issues of 
physiological metaphysics of his day rather succinctly. He could not
conceive the reason why Physicians have laboured so long in accounting for the 
action of the heart and other vital motions of animals, from the powers and 
properties of body independent of the mind: if it be not, that in some, the leaven 
of Cartesianism still continues to work; in others a too great fondness for 
mechanical reasoning in Physiological matters; and in both, a contempt of the 
extravagant flights of S tahl and his followers, with regard to the manner in 
which the mind regulates all the actions of the body.'*
Whytt was opposed to the Cartesian principles that the vital functions 
take place independently of the mind, that the essence of the mind is to
 ^ ‘The institutes of medicine by Dr Cullen Oct. 28, 1772’ (5 vols.): National Library of 
Medicine, Bethesda, Md., MS. B4 (hereafter ‘NLM ’), vol. II, fol. 25.
 ^ Robert Whytt, An essay on the vital and other involuntary motions of animals (Edinburgh 
1751), P- 277. Subsequent quotations are from this first edition except where otherwise 
indicated.
John P. Wright
be conscious, and that the body operates through the same mechanical 
laws which govern inanimate nature. But he was also opposed to the 
m a in  alternative— t^he so-called Stahlian theory, which maintained that 
the mind controls the body by acting as a “rational” principle (Essay, 
p. 289). Both the Cartesian view and the Stahlian theory were espoused 
by Whytt’s Scottish contemporaries.
In this paper I shall explain the issues concerning the mutual 
interaction of mind and body which were debated by eighteenth-century 
Scottish physiologists. Their debates must be understood against the 
background of a dualism between mental and vital functions. This 
dualism, which we may caW function dualism, had been clearly set out in 
Cartesian writings such as the Description of the human body, where 
Descartes rejected the view that the soul or mind is responsible for life 
processes, and where he limited its functions to those accompanied by 
self-conscious thought.^ Such a position was adopted by Hermann 
Boerhaave, whose thought played an important role in eighteenth- 
century Scottish physiology. The essential problems posed by the 
writers we shall look at concern the extent to which the vital processes 
affect the mind, and the extent to which and manner whereby mental 
processes, however they arise, affect those vital processes. These 
problems, though independent, are closely related to the question 
whether the vital processes can be explained mechanically. But I shall 
argue that physiologists such as Whytt and Porterfield, who maintained 
that the life functions require mind or soul, went beyond a bare rejection 
of mechanism. They conceived of mind and its basic functions of 
sensation and volition in very different ways from those who subscribed 
to the basic principles of Cartesian metaphysics, as well as in very 
different ways from one another.
It may be cause for surprise that major issues in what we should now 
call philosophy of mind were discussed by medical writers of whom few 
present-day philosophers have heard. However, I hope to show that our 
lack of acquaintance may not indicate any lack of profundity in their 
thought or in the problems they debated. Traditional history of 
philosophy in addressing the philosophy of mind has perhaps concen­
trated too narrowly on theological issues which arise from a substance 
dualism. This dualism was also given a seventeenth-century philosophi­
cal formulation by Descartes, in his conceptual distinction between two 
different natures, a thinking and an extended one. But it needs to be
’ The philosophical writings of Descartes (hereafter trans. J. G. Cottingham and
others, vol. i  (Cambridge 1985), pp. 314-15. Cf. Passions of the soul, arts. 4-5 {PWD, yol. I ,  
p. 329). On the Cartesian programme in physiology see T. S. Hall, History ofgeneral physiology, 
vol. I (Chicago 1975), esp. pp. 256-7, and his translation of Rene Descartes, Treatise of man 
(Cambridge, Mass. 1972).
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carefully distinguished from what I have called/wncrion dualism. Many 
who adopted substance dualism (Boerhaave and Haller are obvious 
examples) hold that there is a one-to-one correspondence between 
mental events and brain events, however it is to be explained. 
Nevertheless, the central issues of mid-eighteenth-century philosophy 
of mind lie elsewhere—in the problems raised by function dualism. Both 
a more accurate history, and (in so far as our present-day concepts have 
their roots in that history) a more fruitful philosophy, will result from 
taking such problems seriously.
By the time Cullen was giving his lectures in the early 1770s, the 
Edinburgh Medical School was among the most renowned in Europe. 
He himself had been a student in its early years in the mid to late 1730s. 
In his clinical lectures of 1785-86 he commented that during his studies 
he had “learned the system of Boerhaave” and was taught to think that 
that medical system was “very perfect, complete and sufficient” . When 
he had returned to Edinburgh some twenty years later he “still found the 
system of Boerhaave prevailing as much as ever” .® Cullen claimed to 
reject important parts of Boerhaave’s system—for example, the view of 
the body as a hydraulic machine.’ He stressed the centrality of the central 
nervous system in the production of life processes,* and tended to think 
of it as operating on principles analogous to those of static electricity 
{Institutions, props. 125,130). However, in section V of this paper I shall 
argue that Cullen adopted a Cartesian conception of mind which was 
closer to that of Boerhaave than to that of his own immediate 
predecessors. It is Cullen’s analyses of “sensation” and “volition” 
which provided his solution to the problem of mind-body interaction 
posed by them.
Although there are good grounds to question Cullen’s retrospective 
claim about the monolithic teaching of physiology among his predeces­
sors, there is no doubt that Boerhaave’s doctrines were very important in 
the Edinburgh curriculum until about 1760. For this reason I begin in 
the next section with a study of the central principles of Boerhaave’s 
physiological system. In section III, I examine the metaphysical 
physiology of William Porterfield and its seventeenth-century anti- 
Cartesian origins. The fourth section is devoted to the ideas of Robert
‘ John Thomson, An account of the life, lectures, and writings of William Cullen, M.D., vol. I 
(Edinburgh 1859), pp. 118-19.
 ^ NLM, II, fol. I .  Cullen purported to adopt the system of Friedrich Hoffmann, whose 
Pundamenta medicinae was published in 1695. But Cullen exaggerated the extent to which 
Boerhaave disregarded the nervous system. Indeed, Haller took issue with Boerhaave because 
he attributed too much influence to the nervous power (sect. IV below).
* In commenting on proposition 97 of his Institutions in 1772, Cullen spoke of the animal 
power seated in the brain as “the fundamental part of the System without which the Functions 
cannot long remain” . This power was either “a Sentient principle or a Mechanical Energy” 
(NLM, II, fols. 195-6).
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Whytt, the undoubted genius of eighteenth-century Scottish physi­
ology, whose metaphysical ideas are rooted in a very different medical 
and philosophical tradition from that of Boerhaave. In the final section I 
examine the synthesis of earlier ideas which was effected by Cullen.
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I I .  BOERHAAVIAN P H Y S IO L O G Y  AT E DIN BUR GH
While there had been earlier attempts to found a medical school in 
Edinburgh, it has been traditional to date its beginning from the 
appointment of four new professors in 1726. Porterfield had been 
appointed to the first chair in the Institutes and Practice of Medicine in 
1724; but while he continued to be an active member of the Royal 
College of Physicians of Edinburgh, and the Edinburgh Society for the 
Improvement of Medical Knowledge, there is no evidence that he ever 
lectured or played any further role in the Medical School. Another 
earlier appointment was that of Alexander Monro (primus) who, as 
professor of Anatomy, played a fundamental role in the foundation of the 
faculty.® All of these men, including Porterfield, had matriculated in 
medicine at the University of Leiden between 1718 and 1720, and 
probably attended the lectures of Boerhaave while they were there.'® 
Boerhaave’s texts were certainly assigned in Edinburgh in the early 
1740s. An advertisement for medical lectures in 1741 announced that Dr 
Andrew St Clair, professor of the Theory of Physic, would teach “by 
explaining the Injtitutiones medicae composed by Dr Herman 
Boerhaave” ." St Clair had been one of the first professors, so it is 
possible that Cullen had attended earlier lectures by him, as well as those 
of the other teachers in the new School.
The topics which interest us are outlined in various propositions of 
Boerhaave’s Institutiones medicae. This work underwent a number of 
editions, beginning in 1708. The numbered propositions often served as 
little more than a succinct statement of the doctrines developed in 
Boerhaave’s actual lectures. A student’s transcription of St Clair’s Latin 
lectures on this work has been preserved and I shall refer to this after 
examining Boerhaave’s own doctrines. These were readily available to 
students after 1739 with Haller’s publication of Boerhaave’s lectures." A 
somewhat free English translation appeared a few years later under the
’ A. Grant, The story of the University of Edinburgh, vol. I (London 1884), pp. 298-315, 
217-29.
■° E. A. Underwood, Boerhaave’s men (Edinburgh 1977), esp. pp. i02fT.
■' Scots magazine 3 (1741), p. 371.
Hermann Boerhaave, Praelectiones academicae in proprias institutiones rei medicae, edited 
with notes by A. von Haller [ i739- 44l> 2nd edn., 6 vols. (Venice 1743-45). Hereafter, 
‘Praelectiones’: I shall refer to this by volume and page number.
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title Dr. Boerhaave’s academical lectures on the theory of physic,^^ in the 
following account I shall generally quote from this, supplementing or 
replacing it where necessary.
Boerhaave’s commitment to mechanism in medicine was armounced 
in his Oratio de usu ratiocinii mechanici in medicinaf* delivered in Leiden 
in 1703, in the third year after his appointment to a lectureship in 
medicine. He compared the human body to a clock which anyone can see 
to be faulty, but which can only be corrected by the expert who “from his 
knowledge of the correct structure, discerns the defects of the parts and 
the ways and means of repairing them” (Orations, p. i n ) .  To the 
objection that “life, diseases and health derive from non-mechanical 
principles” , since the mind has power over the body, Boerhaave replied 
that “as soon as the capacity of thinking influences our body, every effect 
it brings about therein is wholly corporeal, and so subject to mechanical 
laws” . Even if the prime cause were incorporeal, still the physician need 
only concern himself with corporeal conditions in medicine (p. 114).'^
The clock image appeared again in Boerhaave’s discussion of the 
natural sources of medical knowledge at the beginning of the Academical 
lectures. He noted that the human body can act as an automaton, and gave 
a watch as the example of the latter. An automaton is a “Machine that 
performs various Motions without any other Cause than the Mechanism 
of its own Parts within itself^ which, when once put in Motion, continues 
so, from the same Cause” . The analogy is used to support a view of the 
animal body as a machine which can operate completely independently, 
without any cause but the necessary motion of its own inner mechanism. 
The mainspring in the body is the heart, “which continues its alternate 
Contractions and Dilations so long as the Animal lives” . Boerhaave 
noted that such motions are independent of the mind: they can be 
neither produced nor destroyed “by the influence of the Mind or Will” 
(Lectures, 4.1).
The examples of automatic motions which he went on to give indicate 
that he had in mind a far more complex machine than a clock. In 
proposition 4 he was primarily concerned with the automatic responses 
of the body for preserving health and warding off disease. He gave a 
number of examples of automatic defence mechanisms of the body— 
which he identified with the Hippocratic healing power of Nature.
John P. Wright
Dr. Boerhaave’s academical lectures on the theory of physic, being . . .  a translation of his 
Institutes and explanatory comment, 5 vols. (London 1752-56). Hereafter, ‘Lectures’: 
propositions themselves will appear as a number alone or with a section number in parentheses 
(e.g. 401(2)); numbered lecture notes will follow a decimal point.
Translated in Boerhaave’s orations, trans. E. Kegel-Brinkgreve and A. M. Luyendijk- 
Elshout (Leiden 1983), 85-120.
Cf. Descartes’ Description of the human body {PWD, vol. i, p. 315).
When Poison, has been taken, the Animal must inevitably perish, if its Force 
gets into the Blood . . . ; but provident Nature, or this automatic Motion 
generally does, what every,expert Physician ought first to do, i.e. ejects it by 
Vomit.
Another example used to stress the independence of these defensive 
motions from the mind is of particular interest. The mind is not
able to suppress these automatic Endeavours of our Machines for Self- 
preservation. Suppose one Friend tells another that he is only going to threaten 
him with a Blow upon the Eye, and therefore bids him endeavour not to shut it at 
the Offer: The Mind is at that Time secure from Danger; but the specious Offer 
is no sooner made than the Lids of that tender Organ are closed; notwithstand­
ing all the Reasons and Reluctancy of the Mind to the contrary. {Lectures, 4.1)
This example had been employed by Descartes in his Passions of the soul 
(sec. 13). It appears that for both thinkers the action of the mind is 
identified with our conscious effort to keep our eyes open; the action 
which occurs in spite of our conscious effort is ascribed to the mechanism 
of the body. Boerhaave stressed that the automatic defence motions of 
the body are made without any consciousness of the mind {sine ulla 
mentis conscientia fiunt: Praelectiones, I, p. 5).
The purely automatic and unconscious action of the body of 
proposition 4 of the Institutes is contrasted in proposition 5 with those 
actions which arise from an “uneasy Sensation” (molesta perceptio) in the 
mind. Boerhaave stressed that this latter is a principle “quite distinct 
from that of the automatic Motions of the Body”, and that “these 
Endeavours” to remove a painful sensation “belong to the Mind” . But 
he carefully distinguished these “Endeavours of the Mind for Ease” into 
two kinds—those which are quite spontaneous, and those which arise 
from reason and observation. In the first category he places actions such 
as the rubbing of one’s eye to get rid of an itc h i^ o r  the attempt to relieve > 
a muscular pain by trying out different positions of one’s body. The 
second involves a rational observation which determines which of these 
spontaneous remedies really work. This is regarded as an important 
source of the art of medicine {Lectures, 5.1).
The Cartesian doctrine of soul or mind as essentially conscious—like 
that of the automatism in a living body—is central to Boerhaave’s 
Academical lectures. In proposition 27 of his Institutes he asserted that 
“Man is composed of a Body and Mind, united to each other” . He also 
noted that mind and body have distinct natures. In his lecture he 
explained that “the essential Nature of the Mind is to be conscious, or to 
think” .'® For Boerhaave, no less than Descartes, this disjunction does
“Mentis est, esse conscium sive cogitare” {Praelectiones, I, p. 41). Boerhaave was awarded a 
doctorate in philosophy for a thesis De distinctione mentis a corpore (Leiden 1690). He argued
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not indicate a mere tautology. Thought is inherently reflexive: we are not 
merely aware, but are aware of ourselves as being aware.
Boerhaave wrote that volition (voluntas) “is the action of the mind” 
(Lectures 27.6; cf. Descartes, Passions, secs. 13, 17). We have already 
seen that conscious effort played a fundamental role for him in 
distinguishing the action of the mind from the automatic motions of the 
body machine. He included volition, along with perception and 
judgement, as one of the three functions of the mind which constitute its 
“ life” , and noted that the life of the mind is nothing but “to be 
conscious” . Later, he describes a voluntary movement (motus voluntar- 
ius) as one which results from a definition or determination of the mind 
(a mente definiente). He illustrates this by a situation where he has 
decided to move a limb when the hands of a clock reach a certain position 
ten minutes hence^ this is “certainly a Foresight of something not yet 
existing: The inclination comes to me (accedit voluntas), I will (volo), and 
I define the time” . Voluntary action, at least in this case, clearly arises 
from a conscious effort of the will (Lectures, 695.13 ^  Praelectiones, VI, 
pp. 1,6-7). But while everyone is acquainted with volition, it is what “no 
one can explain” (Lectures, 27.6).
While Boerhaave conceived of the conscious will as a source of 
motions in the human body, he also thought that the will itself arises 
from mechanical actions in that body, in particular those arising from 
changes in the nervous system. He describes the way that external 
objects, after causing motions in the nerves, transfer those motions to the 
common sensory in the brain. There they form an idea of the object:
generally this Idea or Representation of the Object excites something more than 
the bare Representation, which is not a simple Idea or Perception, but a 
Determination of the Will with respect to the Idea. (Lectures, 572.1)
It is in the “sensorium” in the brain where all the nerves terminate that 
the impressions of external objects “determine the will either to love or 
hatred” (574.2). Even when we recall a certain idea in obedience to the 
will, this results from “nothing more than a mechanical Disposition or 
Change” in the common sensory (581; cf. 580 for the context). The only
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that the mind “excludes the body” on the ground that mind is “conscious to itself of its own 
thought” and that as such it turns back on itself without being divided; this is impossible in an 
extended thing (chap. 3). He appealed here to the authority of Gerard de Vries, who had argued 
against Dutch Cartesians that belief in innate ideas is irreconcilable with the principle that all 
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hint of an exception to the complete mechanical determination of our 
perceptions, judgements, and volitions came when Boerhaave suggested 
that the thinking of a person engrossed in abstract thought, who becomes 
totally impervious to the state of his body, gives us some evidence that 
the mind “may live hereafter without any Commerce with its Body” 
(27.4). But in general, as Cullen later told his students, the stress 
throughout Boerhaave’s discussion was on the dependence of mental 
processes, including volition, upon the mechanical changes in the body. 
Boerhaave insisted that there is “such a reciprocal Connection and 
Consent between the particular Thoughts and Affections of the Mind 
and the Body, that a Change in one always produces a Change in the 
other, and the reverse” (27(4)). In fact, at least from the point of view of 
medicine, he thought that mechanical changes in the nervous system had 
priority over changes in the mind. He insisted that the physician did not 
need to concern himself with the condition of mind of his patient, even in 
mental disorders, since if the body “is set to rights” the mind “will 
quickly return to its Office” (27.8).
Given his apparent mechanical determinism, we may well ask about 
the significance of dualism in Boerhaave’s lectures, for, as we have seen, 
he asserted unequivocally that mind and body are of different natures. In 
fact, he stressed the difference between sensations on the one hand, and 
the mechanical changes in the brain and the object which cause the 
sensation on the other:
The Idea of Pain which we perceive, neither expresses the Burning nor the 
Dissolution of the N erve; for there is only one Intelligence given to the Mind of a 
present Evil, agreeable to the good Will of the Creator. Sensation therefore is 
nothing either in the Object, or the Nerve affected; but a certain Idea which God 
had determined or assigned to each particular Change in the corporeal Sensory.
(5 7 0 -7 )
It is the fact that these processes are of such a different nature which 
requires that they be connected by a law established by the Deity. Like 
Cullen later, Boerhaave briefly outlined the three philosophical theories 
of the connection of mind and body; but unlike Cullen he opted for one 
of them, namely the Leibnizian. It is likely, he told his students, that 
there is “a Harmony establish’d by God, taking it for an infallible Rule, 
that determinate actions of the Mind must be necessarily attended with 
corresponding Motions in the Body, and the contrary” . But he added 
that the occasionalist theory was also possible.
However, there is a more important dualism implicit in Boerhaave’s 
lectures which is quite different from his distinction between immediate 
objects of awareness and the related mechanical changes in the body. 
This is a dualism between those (brain) processes on which our mental
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functions depend and those processes on which life itself depends. At the 
beginning of his section on pathology Boerhaave made a distinction 
between “animal” or mind-related functions of the body on the one 
hand, and “vital” and “natural” ones on the other. An animal function is 
defined as one which has the power of directly changing thoughts or 
ideas in the mind or being directly changed by the mind. A vital function 
is one on which life immediately depends: the beating of the heart is the 
standard example. The natural functions, like digestion and excretion, 
are required to maintain the body in a continuous state of health. The 
animal functions have no direct effect on the vital and natural ones, nor 
do these directly affect the animal ones:
The vital Actions do not change the Thoughts or Ideas of the Mind; nor, on the 
other Hand, are those Actions dependent on, or determined by, the Mind: For 
the Heart continues to act, whether I am sleeping or waking. Nor are the Ideas of 
the Mind changed from the Exercise of the natural Faculties by which the 
Aliments are formed into Chyle. . . . (695.11)
Thus we have no sensation of the operation of the muscles involved in 
our vital and digestive processes,and these neither directly affect, nor 
can be affected by, the thoughts of the mind.
This dualism of functions depends on the independence of the organs 
on which the functions depend. In his discussion of the “Action of 
Muscles” he noted that when the brain is damaged “in such a Manner as 
to let the Injury extend to the Medulla” then “the actions of all the 
voluntary Muscles cease instantly, together with all the Senses and 
Memory” . In spite of this, the “spontaneous Motions of the involuntary 
Muscles” continue in all the “vital Parts” . However, these too are 
destroyed along with the animal functions, when the cerebellum alone is 
destroyed. Boerhaave stressed that the nerves to the heart arise only from 
the cerebellum, not from the higher brain (401(2-3), 401.7). He also 
distinguished the voluntary muscles from the involuntary ones, even 
those involved in respiration.'* Indeed, in his discussion of sleep, 
Boerhaave went so far as to speak of two distinct machines in the bodies 
of men and animals. One of these “is dead” through much of our lives 
(that is, whenever we are in a dreamless sleep), while the other continues 
to function throughout. He stressed the independent operation of these 
machines, though he also clearly acknowledged the dependence of the 
former on the latter (590.1).
Boerhaave did hold {Lectures, 301.6) that when the heart and other visceral muscles 
become inflamed we feel pain. However, he denied that distinct muscles of the heart were 
sensible.
Boerhaave distinguished the vital from the voluntary causes of respiration and maintained 
that the former can override the latter. Two distinct sets of muscles are controlled by two 
different parts of the brain (Lectures, 6oiff.).
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Boerhaave’s separation of animal and vital functions is closely 
connected with his rejection of the notion of a life soul. In his discussion 
of pathology he identified the soul or psyche as that part of us which 
thinks (Praelectiones, VI, p. 5)- He opposed those who have taken into 
account an “animating Principle” in medicine. In particular, there is no 
evidence for the existence of an “Archeus” or “cogitative Principle” . 
Thus he sets himself clearly against the immaterial physiological and 
pathological principles of two earlier medical writers, Jean-Baptiste van 
Helmont and Georg Stahl {Lectures, 697, 697.2).
But at least one phenomenon lay, as it were, in the gap between the two 
functions which Boerhaave tried to hold separate. We have seen that, for 
Boerhaave, an essential feature of animal functions is that they take place 
with consciousness. This was clearly true of voluntary actions, which he 
located in the brain itself and in certain muscles. But in his Institutes, 
when dealing with muscular action, Boerhaave had written that “while 
the Will remains undetermined” there is no movement of nervous fluid 
toward the voluntary muscles, and thus they remain at rest {Lectures, 
40(14); Praelectiones, III, p. 202). He noted that in sleep “none of the 
voluntary muscles will . . .  be brought into action” {Lectures, 401.23). 
However, he also felt compelled to note an anomalous phenomenon 
which does not easily fit his account. Some actions which originally had 
their source in the will come to be performed by custom without 
consciousness. We often walk without thinking about what we are doing; 
and after we wake up in the morning, we sit up and in doing so place our 
limbs in that position “to which they have been accustomed through the 
whole Course of Life, without giving them any sensible Command of the 
Will” . The English translation has Boerhaave claiming that in such cases 
we operate “from Custom by the Influence of the Mind, of which by 
continued Use we are insensible” (401.24, italics mine); but Boerhaave 
himself did not say that the mind acts insensibly.The translation clearly 
conflicts with what he says elsewhere. Nevertheless, Boerhaave does 
seem to have a problem, given his insistence that voluntary muscles 
operate only under the influence of the will. If the mind must operate in 
order to effect the motion of voluntary muscles, why not say that in the 
problematic cases it acts unconsciously? This is what certain of 
Boerhaave’s Scottish critics were quite prepared to say.
I have called Boerhaave’s distinction between mental and vital 
functions “Cartesian” . He rejects any vital soul and identifies soul with 
that part of us which is conscious. This is clearly in accord with the 
conceptual revolution which Descartes proposed at the beginning of his
otnnino in corpore musculi voluntarii, gui ex sola consuetudine, injussi & nobis non 
consciis operantur", i.e. the voluntary muscles “operate solely from habit, unbidden, and 
without our consciousness of it” {Praelectiones, III, p. 218).
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Description of the human body and elsewhere. Boerhaave went on, in 
accord with the physiological programme which Descartes laid out, to 
describe bodily processes such as the motion of the heart, as resulting 
from the mechanism of the parts and as being entirely automatic. Yet it 
would be wrong simply to call Boerhaave a Cartesian, for his conception 
of the mind and body differ in certain key respects from that of 
Descartes. The difference between their theories of mind is not relevant 
to our present concerns,^® but it is important for our subsequent 
discussion to consider briefly Boerhaave’s general conception of the 
body and how it differs from the Cartesian one.
Like Descartes, Boerhaave held that the basic principles operating in 
the human body were the same as those operative throughout the 
universe. But Descartes had held that body could be completely 
characterized by the attribute of extension, and its processes by the 
mechanical transfer of motion from part to part. In his lecture on 
Institutes prop. 27, Boerhaave adopted the conception of body—then 
accepted by Locke and Newton, as well as Leibniz—as that which is 
impenetrable, as well as extended. Moreover, while he held that the 
“action” of a body consists in the transfer of motion to another body, he 
also spoke of all bodies as having a “life” . Among those things which 
constitute the life of bodies he included the force of attraction between 
the constituent parts. It is commonly said that Boerhaave thought of the 
body merely as a hydraulic machine; but it is more accurate to say he 
conceived of the body machine as involving an interaction between the 
solid elastic vessels and the fluids which were forced through them. The 
force of elasticity played an important role in his conception of the 
generation of motion in the living body. Boerhaave described the body as 
“an Assemblage of small elastic Solids, by whose conjoined and regular 
Actions, Life and Health are produced” . Later he identified elasticity 
with a “Resistance or Re-action common to all Bodies” (695.2). This 
force of elasticity is a “universal Principle of Nature”, and like the power 
of gravitation by which planets are attracted towards each other it is not 
innate in matter itself. It is “to be ascribed only to the Creator of the 
Universe, who has determined this as a Principle uniting the Parts of 
Bodies” . Boerhaave was clearly drawing on a set of concepts which were 
richer than those allowed by Cartesian physics.
Boerhaave defined “mechanics” very broadly as the study which 
teaches one “to apply the general Laws of Motion to all kinds of Bodies” 
(29.3). The fact that he was willing to allow principles such as elasticity 
and attraction did not for him constitute any limitation to mechanism.
“  Against Descartes, Boerhaave held that there is no more to mind itself than the thought of 
the present moment {Lectures, 581.1); he also rejected Descartes’ view that judgement is a 
function of will (586.14).
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However, other writers more firmly planted in the Newtonian tradition 
were concerned to show that the existence of such “active” principles 
did indicate the limits of mechanism in nature itself.""
By Boerhaave’s time most writers on the animal economy expressed 
reservations about the universal application of mechanical principles. 
However, it is important to consider carefully the exact nature of the 
limitations which any given author imposed. Boerhaave commented that 
“they who think that all physical Appearances are to be explained 
mechanically, are in my Opinion misled” (ip.?)- When examined in 
context, this will be seen to be a comment on the limits of our knowledge, 
not a remark to indicate that other principles operate in things besides 
mechanical ones. In his lecture on proposition 40 Boerhaave told his 
students that “there are many, and considerable Motions performed in 
Nature, of whose Causes we are ignorant; but the Motions themselves 
are always subject to those universal Laws which appear true in all 
sensible Bodies” (40.20). He was particularly critical of attempts to 
apply geometrical principles taken from “Bodies of particular Disposi­
tions” to the explanation of complex organic processes (19.7)-
It is, however, misleading to take Boerhaave’s declarations of 
epistemological scepticism too seriously. He did not hesitate to put 
forward mechanical hypotheses to support his own mechanical view of 
the operations of the human body. Throughout his lectures he described 
how the elastic solids which constitute the “vessels” of the body react to 
the “dilatation” or expansion caused by the fiuids which flow into them. 
This interaction was employed in his explanation of the operation of the 
heart. Boerhaave thought that all muscular motion results from the 
motion of a “nervous liquor” or “ spirit” which flows from the brain via 
the nerves, so that it “dilates, fills and alters the Membranes of the Fibres 
[of the muscles], as to reduce them from an oblong to a rounder Figure, 
increasing their smaller Diameter, and diminishing their larger, so as to 
bring Tendons nearer to each other” (402(7)). Boerhaave thought that 
there is a constant pressure of nervous fluid in all the muscles of the body 
keeping them in a constant state of contraction. However, when the 
muscle of the heart contracts, the flow of blood into the auricles makes 
them expand and cut off the flow of fluid from the cardiac nerves “which 
pass into the Heart by the Side of the Aorta and pulmonary Artery” . 
This makes the muscles of the ventricles “paralytic” , allowing them to 
relax and fill up with blood from the auricles. This releases the pressure 
on the cardiac nerves and allows nervous fluid to flow into the muscles of 
the ventricles again, causing them to contract and start the process again. 
The whole system operates in a purely automatic way, depending only
J. P. Wright, ‘Matter, mind and active principles in mid eighteenth-century British 
physiology’, Man and nature 4 (Edmonton 1985)3
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on a continuous pressure of nervous fluid through the nerves and a 
constant supply of blood from the vena cava and pulmonary veins (409). 
We shall see that Robert Whytt presented convincing arguments to show 
that this mechanism of the operation of the heart muscles will not work.
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the teaching of these 
doctrines in Edinburgh. It would, of course, be wrong to conclude that 
just because Boerhaave’s Institutes was used as a text his views were 
always taught uncritically. Nevertheless there is some reason to think, 
both from the statements of Cullen and from the rough set of student 
notes surviving from St Clair’s lectures in 1740,^  ^that some version of 
these doctrines was presented in the 1730s and early 1740s. Like 
Boerhaave, St Clair held that the only explanatory principles for life— 
phenomena are mechanical ones; however, he showed, if anything, more 
scepticism about our ability to fathom what these are. Part of the note on 
proposition 4 reads:
The greatest mistake is of those who wish nothing to be considered in medicine 
except what can be explained mechanically. Nothing indeed should be explained 
except mechanically, but many things may be considered for which no 
mechanical explanation can be given and for which we can give no a priori cause. 
(St Clair, I, pp. 15-16)
This scepticism appears to continue in the lecture on proposition 27, 
where, instead of giving the essence of body and mind as Boerhaave had 
done, the view is expressed that “the cleverest .philosopher does not 
know the intimate nature of anything” (p. 79). Nevertheless, though in a 
rather confused way, Boerhaave’s central- teaching on these topics 
emerges in the course of the lecture.
What appears to be a more substantial difference occurs at the 
beginning of the lecture on proposition 27. At first sight St Clair appears 
totally opposed to Boerhaave’s own central doctrine on the indepen­
dence of cognitive and vital functions. The manuscript reads: “Mind is 
part of man himself. If the soul is destroyed, this makes the body lifeless 
and rigid” (p. 79). It would seem that life processes are being ascribed to 
some sort of vital soul! However, what follows is a Boerhaavian account 
which clearly separates the mind from any vital functions:
Let me first overturn the objections of those who argue that the human body 
without the prop of mind is lifeless and useless.. . . Let such a philosopher order 
if he can his own heart to move slower or faster. Can he determine the blood 
through his own body by the power of mind. . . ? From these and many others it 
is clear that most activities obey the power of mind not at all. (p. 80)
Like Boerhaave, St Clair claimed that “to think is to be conscious” and




Porterfield’s comments on the operations of the mind in the body first 
appeared towards the end of the initial part of the article, in the course of 
his discussion of the cause of the fact that our two eyes—unlike those of 
chameleons and other animals—operate together (‘Motions of our eyes’, 
I, pp. i63ff.). He began with an account of what he called “the final 
Cause of this uniform Motion”, or, in other words, the ways in which it 
is advantageous to us. The first advantage is that it results in a stronger, 
more lively, and perfect image of the object (p. 184). He also argued that 
uniform motion is not necessary to see a single object with two eyes 
(pp. 192-252).^^ He rejected Berkeley’s theory of vision (which relies on 
an experienced correlation of sight with touch), arguing that we have a 
kind of immediate knowledge of externality through sight (pp. 229ff.). 
Nevertheless, his own account of vision is not purely innatist and, like 
that of Berkeley, takes account of the role of experience.
The most important advantage of the imiform motion of our eyes, 
according to Porterfield, is in enabling us “to judge with more Certainty 
of the Distance of Objects” (p. 187). The most common and reliable 
method of judging distance is by our knowledge of the angle made by the 
axis of each of our eyes when they focus together on an object in front of 
us: the smaller the angle made at the convergence of the lines from each 
eye at the object, the more distant the object. The judgement is made on 
the basis of our feeling or sensation of the motion of each eye as it focuses 
inward on the object (p. 189). His account here closely follows that of 
Malebranche.^® Like Malebranche, he held that this sensation incorpor­
ates a kind of natural judgement of distance.^® This depends on an innate 
principle that “Every Point of an Object appears and is seen without the 
Eye nearly in a straight Line, drawn perpendicularly to the Retina, from 
that Point of it where its Image falls” (p. 208). Porterfield seems to think 
that it is by employing this principle that we are naturally able to judge 
the,distance of objects by the uniform motions of our eyes. Malebranche 
had called such judgements “natural” because they are formed “in 
ourselves, independently of ourselves, and even in spite of ourselves” .^ ® 
He ascribed such judgements to God, who makes them just as we would 
do if we knew all the laws of optics and geometry as well as everything
He argued that this is effected in cross-eyed people in spite of the fact that their two eyes do 
not focus together. Porterfield correctly opposes Claude Perrault on this.
Nicolas Malebranche, The search after truth, trans. T. M. Lennon and P. J. Olscarap 
(Columbus 1980), pp. 737-8.
“The Judgment we form of the Situation and Distance of visual Objects, depends not on 
Custom and Experience, but on an original connate and immutable Law, to which our Minds 
have been subjected from the Time they were first united to our Bodies.” (p. 214)
Malebranche, De la Recherche de la verite, ed. G. Rodis-Lewis, in Oeuvres completes de 
Malebranche, vol. i (Paris 1958), p. 119; cf. p. 99. My translation. For an account of 
Malebranche’s theory of vision see j'. P. Wright, The sceptical realism of David Hume 
(Manchester 1983), pp. 66-7, 225.
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that was happening in our eyes and brains. Porterfield, on the other 
hand, does not claim that the natural judgement takes place entirely 
independently of our will. What I have called his innate principle is not 
in itself sufficient to allow us to judge the distance of objects. Indeed our 
judgement of distance by means of the innate principle depends on a 
voluntary and rational decision to use our eyes together.
This becomes clear when Porterfield turns to “the efficient Cause” of 
the uniform motion of our eyes at the end of the first part of the essay 
(PP- 253ff.). “By what Necessity”, he asks, does it happen that “both 
Eyes are always turned the same way, so that none of us are able at 
pleasure to give them different Directions?” He rejects the ancient 
theory which attempted to account for this by the union of the two optic 
nerves, pointing out that these nerves have no connection with the 
muscles of the eye which are responsible for this motion. The true cause 
turns out to be nothing but “Custom and Habit” , which operate imder 
the direction of the mind. Whatever necessity there is in the action 
results from the mind itself. For “it is not to be doubted but these 
Motions are voluntary, and depending upon our Mind, which being a 
wise Agent, wills them to move uniformly” (p. 255).
There are really two closely related features of this action which lead 
Porterfield to ascribe it to the mind—that it is learned and that it is useful 
to us. Like chameleons, human infants “for some Time after Birth, can 
look different Ways with their Eyes” . Moreover, they continue to do so 
until “discovering the Advantage of directing them the same way, they 
come to move them always uniformly” (p. 259). Here experience plays a 
role: infants make a voluntary decision to employ their eyes together 
after discovering that this results in the ability to determine the distance 
of objects. In this also, we see the importance of Porterfield’s earlier 
discussion of the “final cause” of the uniform motion of our two eyes, he 
clearly regarded the action of moving both together as an intentional 
action adopted for its utility. The infant acts both freely and with some 
kind of foresight, based on the experienced result of employing both eyes 
together.
It is due to the repetition of this action that, after a time, most human 
beings and other animals cannot move their eyes independently: “This 
uniform Motion by Use and Habit at last becomes so necessary, that the 
Eyes cannot be moved differently” (p. 259). That there is no “intrinsical 
Necessity” in this is clear from cross-eyed children who move their eyes 
separately. The necessity experienced by most of us arises from the fact 
that “the Mind has imposed upon itself that Law founded upon the 
Utility and Advantage that arises from this sort of Motion” (pp. 255-6). 
Later, in A treatise on the eye, Porterfield will refer to this as a “moral 
necessity” {Treatise, vol. 2, p. 154).
Metaphysics and physiology 2 6 7
268
In the second part of the original essay Porterfield extended this 
analysis to motions of the body which most would consider to be quite 
involuntary. Indeed he includes among them one which, as we have 
seen, Boerhaave and Descartes considered to be directly contrary to the 
action of the mind.
If a Body be hastily moved towards our Eyes, they will shut without our being 
conscious thereof; neither is it in our Power to do otherwise, because we have 
accustomed ourselves to do so on the like Occasions; for such is the Power of 
Custom and Habit, that many Actions which are no doubt voluntary, and 
proceed from our Mind, are in certain Circumstances rendered so necessary, as 
to appear altogether mechanical and independent on our Wills. (‘Motions of our 
eyes’, II, pp. 213-14)
Unlike Boerhaave, Porterfield did not think that this action actually is 
mechanical and independent of our wills. He asserts that it is voluntary 
and directed by the mind. Indeed, Porterfield did not identify voluntary 
with conscious action. For he acknowledges that we are not conscious of 
the motions of our eyelids. It is clear that we do not have any 
consciousness even of an effort of the mind in producing those motions: 
indeed, what I am conscious of is the contrary effort to keep my eyes 
open. But Porterfield did not think that my current consciousness of an 
inability to keep my eyes open shows that the action is not performed by 
my mind. He thinks that the true action of my mind is the one which 
results in the closing of my eyelids. This arises from a law which I impose 
on myself through custom and habit.
The most obvious objection to Porterfield’s claim that the closing of 
the eyelids is volimtary is that we cannot do otherwise. However, he 
thinks that there is an important sense in which this is just false. There 
are people “who can keep them open, though the Organs subservient to 
their Motions are the same as in other Men” . He appeals to the case cited 
in Plempius of Roman gladiators, who, through “uncommon Fortitude 
and Courage, had not accustomed themselves on every trifling Occasion 
to shut their Eye-lids for the Defence of their Eyes” (p. 215). This and 
other examples show that the shutting of the lids is preventable even for 
the rest of us. In his Treatise Porterfield held that in “philosophical 
Strictness of Speech” a “moral Impossibility” such as that which we 
find in the case of the closing of our eyelids “is indeed no Necessity or 
Impossibility at all” . Custom still “leaves the Mind at absolute Liberty 
to do as it pleases” . One might as well deny the freedom of an honest man 
who, having formed a “fixt and determined Resolution of acting always 
agreeably to what he sees to be fit and right”, finds it impossible to “do a 
dishonest Thing” . The impossibility is merely that “it is absurd, 
mischievous and morally impossible for it to chuse to act . . . foolishly
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and unreasonably” {Treatise, vol. 2, pp. I54“ 5)- Like Boerhaave and the 
Cartesians, Porterfield thought the shutting of our eyelids contributes to 
our self-preservation, but he rejected the view of these thinkers that it is 
automatic—performed by the body without the mind (‘Motions of our 
eyes’, II, p. 215). The goal of self-preservation is that of the individual 
mind itself which freely adopts this way of acting.
It is surprising to discover Porterfield does not even consider the 
possibility that what is performed through custom and habit is 
performed mechanically. Descartes, Malebranche, and even Locke, had 
presented mechanical hypotheses—based on the creation of pathways in 
the brain—to account for the formation of mental and physical habits. 
While Boerhaave was troubled by the fact that voluntary muscles can 
move habitually without the action of the will, he accounted for the 
associations of ideas on which such habits depend by postulating 
mechanical connections in the common sensory {Lectures, 580.1). Thus 
he had the basis for the mechanical account of habit developed by his 
predecessors.
The chief function of custom and habit in Porterfield’s explanation of 
actions such as the uniform motions of our eyes pnd the shutting of our 
eyelids was, it seems, that of making them unconscious, and so giving 
them the appearance of necessity. He wrote that “the Mind, which at 
first always acted from a Principle of Interest, comes at length to be 
determined by Habit and Custom, without examining how far such 
motions may be profitable or hurtful to us, or at least without being 
sensible of any such Examination; and this is the only Reason can be 
given, why none of us are now able to move our Eyes differently 
(pp. 214-15, italics mine). This suggests that even after such actions are 
performed insensibly they may still involve a rational examination of 
what is the best motion. Perhaps Porterfield thought that when a hand is 
thrust in my eyes I make a very quick inference that closing them is the 
most useful action! In any case, he seems to have recognized that in 
allowing that the mind could act insensibly he was stepping into 
philosophically dangerous waters. He knew that “it has been alledged by 
Locke and others, that all the Thoughts and Operations of the Mind, 
must necessarily be attended with Consciousness”, and that this would 
be thought to tell against his claim that the actions he was describing 
were performed by the mind. In the article Porterfield did not want to get 
involved in the “metaphysical Question” of the extent that “Thoughts 
and Operations of the Mind, may or may not imply Consciousness” 
(p. 216); though in his later book, he rejected Locke’s appeal to direct 
experience to show that there are times in sleep when the mind is neither 
“sensible nor active” . Porterfield claimed that, while direct experience 
could not decide the question, there were arguments to show that
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animals “are always both percipient and active” when asleep.^' In the 
essay he limited himself to the claim that “there are Motions 
unquestionably voluntary and depending on the Mind, which by 
Custom and Habit have become so easy as to be performed without our 
Knowledge or Attention” (II, p. 217). While he drew back from his 
earlier statement that such actions are performed “without our being 
conscious thereof” (p. 213), it is difficult not to conclude that he is 
saying the same in different words.^^
These views about the unconscious operation of the mind are 
important when, in the second part of the essay, Porterfield spelled out 
an earlier suggestion that the mind itself is the efficient cause of the vital 
and natural operations of the body. He argued that, if the mind can think 
and be “very little conscious” of it as the Cartesians claimed, “ I see not 
why it may not also be allowed to exert its active Power in the 
Government of the vital and natural Motions, without our Knowledge 
and Attention” . When children first learn to walk, “the whole Mind is 
employed in conducting the Motions necessary for their Progression”, 
so that if they cease to attend to the activity, they will soon fall down. But 
when these motions come to be performed easily through custom and 
habit, “they need but little Attention, and allow the Mind to employ its 
most serious and anxious Thoughts about other Matters” (pp. 226-7). 
By parity of reasoning, when a baby is born, its soul is totally involved 
“in regulating and governing the internal Motions, which are yet 
difficult, by reason it has not yet been much accustomed to them” . But 
when the soul or mind becomes accustomed to performing vital actions 
such as the beating of the heart, and natural actions such as the digestion 
of food, it is progressively able to attend to “external Objects” . Thus the 
baby comes to appear “ less and less sleepy and unactive” . But what is 
really happening is that the mind, while it continues to perform them, is 
able to direct its attention away from the vital and natural operations of 
its own body (pp. 225-6). Thus Porterfield is suggesting that, just as in 
the case of the habitual actions which were discussed earlier, these latter 
continue to be produced voluntarily but without any self-conscious 
awareness.
What Porterfield has noted is a common process by which actions 
which are self-consciously chosen come to be performed without our 
conscious control. Such actions, for example of the muscles in walking.
Treatise on the eye, vol. 2, pp. 156-9. Porterfield argues that it is especially clear that birds, 
which have to grip branches in the wind, perceive and put forth some active power. While 
Borelli, in De motu animalium, had argued convincingly that the “mechanical Disposition of the 
Muscles” is used to help them “grasp the Branch more forcibly”, it is clear, thinks Porterfield, 
that these muscles alone are not sufficient to account for the phenomena.
Porterfield confuses the issue in his book by claiming that the mind is conscious while 
asleep. Robert Whytt had no such hesitancy in admitting that the mind acts unconsciously.
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come through custom and habit to be performed without knowledge and 
attention. His suggestion about the control of the vital and natural 
operations of the body .is based on an extrapolation of the common 
process to explain a, phenomenon to which we do-not ordinarily think it 
applies. The legitimacy of this extrapolation was challenged by later 
Scottish thinkers.
In support of his hypothesis that the vital operations of the body are 
voluntary, Porterfield also cited evidence which had been presented a 
few years earlier in George Cheyne’s popular study, The English malady. 
Cheyne had described the case of a Colonel Townshend who had 
summoned him a few days before death to show that he “could at 
pleasure suppress all the vital Motions, so as in all Respects to appear 
dead, and yet by an Effort, or some how, he could come to Life again, and 
restore these Motions” (‘Motions of our eyes’, II, p. 222). Cheyne had 
reported that he and two other physicians, while doubtful that any such 
thing was possible “as it was not to be accounted for from now common 
Principles”, agreed to wimess the experiment. After a half hour or so the 
man’s pulse was no longer detectable and they assumed he had carried 
the experiment too far. However, the pulse did finally become detectable 
again and the man did regain full consciousness. Cheyne “went away 
fully satisfy’d as to all the Particulars of this Fact, but confounded and 
puzled, and not able to form any rational Scheme that might account for 
it” .33 In reporting the case, Porterfield wrote Aat it is “not at all to be 
accoimted for, without allowing the Mind to preside over the vital 
Motions” (p. 222). He appears to have considered this case parallel to 
that of the gladiators who can prevent themselves from closing their 
eyelids when a hand is thrust'in their faces. The unusual case supports 
the hypothesis that even ordinary heart motion is voluntary.
Porterfield and Cheyne seem to have believed that the Townshend 
case provided a kind of crucial experiment which challenged the claim of 
Boerhaave and his followers that the mind cannot affect the vital and 
natural motions of the body. However, as we have seen from St Clair’s 
lectures, the whole medical establishment was not immediately won 
over. St Clair challenged physicians like Porterfield and Cheyne to show 
that they could voluntarily control the beating of their own hearts. They 
seem never to have taken up the challenge!
Our authors also appealed to the evidence that the vital motions of the 
body are influenced by the passions of fear, grief, joy, rage, etc. 
(‘Motions of our eyes’, II, p. 222; English malady, p. 68). Boerhaave had
George Cheyne, The English malady (London 1733), pp. 307-11. Cheyne was a Scot from 
Aberdeenshire who had studied medicine in Edinburgh with Archibald Pitcairne, one of the 
leading figures of European iatro-mechanism. Cheyne went to London in 1702, where, as well 
as setting up a medical practice, he became a member of the Royal Society.
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considered love and hatred to arise in a kind of automatic way from the 
effect of objects on us. In his pathology he explicitly identified the 
passions with mechanical changes in the common sensory {Lectures, 
744.4). This was in accord with the general conception of die passions 
espoused by Descartes, who regarded the mental aspect of the passion, 
that is the feeling, as a kind of epiphenomenon.^^ But writers at this time 
challenged this account and argued that the influence of the passions 
indicated the effect of the mind on the body.^^
Porterfield and Cheyne regarded themselves as breaking with the 
dominant physiological tradition when they presented their accounts of 
both the nature and extent of the mind’s control over the body. At the 
same time, both writers accepted current mechanical accoxmts of the 
bodily processes themselves. Porterfield wrote that “we all know there is 
nothing in the animal Machine but an Infinity of branching and winding 
Canals, filled with Liquors of different Natures, going the same 
perpetual Round” (‘Motions of our eyes’, II, p. 219). He was repeating 
the image set out in the introduction of Cheyne’s English malady. 
Cheyne told his readers that to understand what he had to say about 
nervous diseases, they
need only suppose, that the Human Body is a Machin of an infinite Number and 
Variety of different Channels and Pipes, filled with various and different 
Liquors and Fluids, perpetually running, glideing, or creeping forward, or 
returning backward in a constant Circle, and sending out little Branches and 
Outlets, to moisten, nourrish, and repair the Experience of living.
Cheyne had even sought to give some satisfaction to “those acquainted 
with first Philosophy, Natural History, the Laws constantly observed by 
Bodies in their actions on one another, and the established Relations of 
Things” {English malady, pp. 4ff.). Clearly, like Boerhaave, Cheyne and 
Porterfield thought that the general laws of mechanics were applicable to 
organic processes; neither thought that any other laws were required. In 
order to understand how these writers conceived of the limits of 
mechanism in explaining organic processes, it is useful to examine how 
they related their own views to those of two of the most important 
philosophical systems of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
namely Cartesianism and Newtonianism.
Porterfield’s clear rejection of Cartesianism emerged through his 
criticism of Descartes’ attempt to give a purely mechanical account of 
animal reproduction from the mixture of fluids of the male and female of 
each species. In the formation of an animal, Porterfield wrote, “there is a
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See Passions of the soul, arts. 27, 29 {PWD, vol. i, pp. 338-9).
See the interesting argument in Nicholas Robinson, A new system of the spleen, vapours, 
andhypochondriack melancholy (London 1729), pp. 85-6. This originates with Claude Perrault.
necessity that the Head, Heart, Nerves, Veins and Arteries, should be 
formed at the same time”, not successively, since none of these organs 
can operate without the others. But this is impossible, “for no Motion of 
any Fluid or Fluids, howsoever disposed, can ever form all these at the 
same instant” . Porterfield also implicitly criticized the pre-formationist 
theory which was accepted by most contemporary physiologists.^® Since, 
as these thinkers admitted, some “active immaterial Cause” is necessary 
in the first formation of animals, it is puzzling that “after that, so great 
Concern should be shewn to reduce all to mere Mechanism” . Why not 
agree that the operations of the living body continue to have “Need of 
new Impressions from some such vital Principle as first set them 
a-going” (‘Motions of our eyes’, II, pp. 219-21)?
Through the use of the expression ‘active immaterial Cause’ 
Porterfield placed his own claim that the vital and natural motions of an 
animal body cannot be explained entirely mechanically in the context of 
the Newtonian philosophy of his day. He cited (p. 219) a note in 
Rohault’s System of natural philosophy, illustrated with Dr. Clarke’s notes 
taken mostly out of Sir Isaac Newton’s philosophy (1723), in which Samuel 
Clarke stated that perpetual motion on purely mechanical principles is 
impossible. Porterfield argued that there can be no perpetual motion 
machine, because “there is no avoiding a greater or lesser Degree of 
Friction, though the Machine be form’d according to the exactest 
Principles of Geometry and Mechanicks” (p. 218). In making such an 
appeal he could also have turned directly to the authority of Newton. 
Newton had claimed in his Opticks that the mechanical motion in the 
universe is “always upon the Decay” owing to the “Tenacity of Fluids, 
and Attrition of their Parts, and the Weakness of Elasticity in Solids” . 
He concluded that, since
the variety of Motion which we find in the World is always decreasing, there is a 
necessity of conserving and recruiting it by active Principles, such as are the 
Cause of Gravity, by which Planets and Comets keep their Motions in the Orbs, 
and Bodies acquire great Motion in falling; and the cause of Fermentation, by 
which the Heart and Blood of Animals are kept in perpetual Motion and Heat.
There are “active Principles” in the universe which are required to 
recruit the constant loss of motion; these principles are identified as 
being like those which cause perpetual motion in animal bodies.E ven 
more explicitly, in his famous dispute with Leibniz, Newton’s spokes­
man Clarke stated that any sort of increase in motion in nature must arise 
from “a principle of life and activity” .^ * In insisting on the importance of
Among them, Boerhaave. See S. A. Roe, M atter, life and generation (Cambridge 1981), 
esp. pp. 1-9.
Sir Isaac Newton, Opticks (London 1931), pp. 398-9.
The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, ed. H. G. Alexander (Manchester I95®)> P- 112.
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non-mechanical active principles in animal bodies, Porterfield was 
appealing to a doctrine at the heart of Newtonian natural philosophy.
But Porterfield also distanced himself from the form of the Newtonian 
philosophy which we have seen refiected in Boerhaave. According to this 
the motions of an animate body depend on the same active principles, for 
example elasticity, as other inanimate bodies in the universe. Porterfield 
wrote that
If it should be said, that these Motions do not depend on Mechanism alone, but 
on Mechanism join’d with certain active Powers or Forces, imprinted by the 
Author of Nature upon all the Bodies of this Universe, such as are the Powers of 
Attraction and Repulsion, by which the greatest Phaenomena of Nature are 
unquestionably produced; it is.incumbent on those who entertain this Opinion, 
to explain particularly how these Motions are thus continued by these active 
Principles, before they can expect that we should believe them. (pp. 221-2)
In his later Treatise, he took issue with what appears to be a variant of 
this theory which he ascribed to his great Swiss contemporary, Haller. 
According to Porterfield, Haller held that the irritability which he had 
discovered to exist in muscle fibres even after they were cut out of the 
body, like Newtonian gravitation, results from the stimulus acting as a 
mere occasional cause of the muscular motion. But Porterfield himself 
held that “transient and short-lived Motions”, such as those excited by 
stimuli applied to muscles when they are cut out, can be explained purely 
mechanically {Treatise, vol. 2, esp. p. 167). It is only the continued 
operation of these and other motions in vivo which requires the existence 
of an active principle.
The principle postulated by Porterfield is neither the Deity nor some 
special active material principle under the Deity: it is the individual 
mind of the organism which acts continually to keep it going throughout 
life, and even perhaps, as Cheyne had suggested, was responsible for the 
first formation of the animal’s body. Porterfield presents a specific 
account of the limits of mechanism. Nothing in his account requires any 
other physical laws besides mechanical ones. However, he clearly 
rejected the view, supported by Boerhaave as well as Descartes, that the 
animal body is an automaton. The processes of that body are not self- 
maintaining: they require the intervention of an active principle peculiar 
to it, which, as we have seen earlier, possesses both intelligence and will.
The account of this principle places us in the centre of Porterfield’s 
physiological psychology. For, as we shall see in the next section, the 
Newtonian ideas about the limits of mechanism and about the necessity 
for active powers which he adopted could be given an entirely different 
physiological interpretation. What is central in Porterfield’s discussion 
is his anti-Cartesian view that there is a continuous transition from
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actions which are consciously chosen to those which are done necessarily 
and without consciousness. On the Cartesian account such actions were 
interpreted as undergoing a radical transition from being activities of 
mind to being purely physical operations of the body machine. For 
Porterfield, they are considered to have their source in a single principle, 
the mind itself. Such actions are considered voluntary because they are 
chosen, at least initially, for their usefulness. We cease to be aware of 
them because they are performed under the influence of custom and 
habit. On Porterfield’s account, the criteria that an action is under the 
control of the mind are that it is learned, and that it is originally chosen 
because of its usefulness.
The anti-Cartesian nature of Porterfield’s central ideas is clear from 
an examination of their roots. Cullen identified Porterfield as a Stahlian, 
but I have found no evidence in Porterfield’s writing of any influence of 
Stahl himself. On the other hand, some of Porterfield’s main ideas are 
clearly taken directly from an earlier writer, the French physician 
Claude Perrault.^^ Perrault’s ideas, developed in the 1670s, were 
certainly written against the backdrop of Cartesianism. The close 
parallel between their arguments reveals that the same concerns which 
led Perrault to attack Cartesianism in France in the 1670s were still very 
much alive in Scotland in the 1730s, though in the latter case the 
philosophical views opposed probably appeared largely within the 
context of Boerhaave’s physiology. Put generally, these include the view 
that the mind only acts consciously, that the body machine is an 
automaton, and that the actions of the mind cannot affect the vital and 
natural operations of the human body. Porterfield, no less than Perrault, 
directs his theory against these doctrines
One central doctrine of Perrault does not appear to have been adopted 
by Porterfield, namely the anti-Cartesian position that the soul is not 
only located in the brain but is literally spread throughout the nervous 
system. Indeed, on this issue, Porterfield does adopt the gerierally 
accepted view rather than that of Perrault.'*’ However, a version of 
Perrault’s position was central in the work of Robert Whytt, to whoni I 
shall now turn. It emerges naturally from his metaphysical commit­
ments and experimental work with animals.
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H e r m a n n , The theory of Claude Perrault (London 1973), p .  196).
^  See my account of Perrault in ‘The embodied soul in seventeenth-century French
physiology’, forthcoming.
For Perrault’s view see ‘Du toucher’, in Claude and Pierre Perrault, Oeuvres diverses de 
physique et de mechanique, vol. 2 (Leiden 1721), pp. 529ff- Stahl apparently located * e  soul m 
the brain. His view is contrasted with that of Perrault in Haller’s notes to Boerhaave. See 
Praelectiones, III, p. 228, note 3.
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IV.  W H Y T T  AND THE SE N T I E N T  P R I N C I P L E
Whytt appears to have entered the University of Edinburgh in 1728 
(matriculating Feb. 1729) and to have been a student in the fledgling 
Medical School in the early 1730s. Some of his student notes have 
survived and show that at least one teacher associated with medical 
education at that time was critical of Boerhaave’s medical philosophy. 
Part of Whytt’s notebook is based on his studies with Dr George Young, 
an adjunct teacher who practised as a surgeon in the city. Dr John 
Boswell, who obtained the notebook after Whytt’s death, wrote in the 
front that he and Whytt were fellow students under Young in 1730-31. 
According to Boswell, Young was “a great Sceptick in medicine (& 
empirick) as well as in every other thing”, and “confin[ed] himself to 
good evident common sense” . But the notes show that Young went 
beyond scepticism to suggest that there are absolute limits to the 
application of mechanical laws in the human body, limits which made 
the sorts of mechanisms postulated by Boerhaave—or Porterfield— 
quite superfluous. Moreover, his “common sense” appears to have led 
him to suggest that there are special laws which apply to animal bodies as 
a result of their being animated by a spiritual being.
Of particular interest for our present purposes are notes entitled ‘Of 
muscular motion’ (pp. 43 iff.) and ‘Of Sensation’ (pp. 467ff.). Whytt 
headed the first ‘An Enquiry into the Cause of muscular Motion, from 
Mr Youngs papers’, and it is a reasonable assumption that, since the 
second note continues many of the same themes and is written in the 
same style, it too is from Young’s papers.
In the first note Young was concerned with the cause of the motion of 
voluntary muscles. Writers on this agreed that the “free Influx” of 
appropriate fluids from the arteries and nerves was a necessary condition 
for this motion (since when they are tied it cannot occur) and that the 
“voluntary motion of the act of the will is the ultimate cause” . They also 
assume that the will must use “some Instrument to Dilate the muscle”, 
and only disagree as to “what is the Instrument or Instruments” by 
which this is effected (pp. 431-2). Young runs through the various 
mechanical and chemical hypotheses of late 17th- and early 18th- 
century writers, pointing out that none of them could be supported by 
any evidence of the senses: “the great Boerhaave himself never saw his 
greater Influx of the animal Spirits by which he accounts for muscular 
motion” (pp. 434-5).
RCPE, MS. M9.19. George Young (1692-1757) was a member of an important 
intellectual society in eighteenth-century Edinburgh called the Rankenian club. See M. A. 
Stewart, ‘Berkeley and the Rankenian club’, in George Berkeley: essays and replies, ed. D. 
Berman (Dublin 1986), esp. pp. 36-7.
Young did not reject the existence of all mechanisms which cannot be 
directly perceived by the senses, but he argued that the only basis for 
postulating such a mechanism is that it is found together with some other 
phenomenon which we have discovered to be inseparably connected 
with it in our experience. Thus he considered the objection that his 
rejection of unobservables would lead to the denial that the blood 
circulates, since “we cannot trace it through its smallest vessels” . 
Moreover, “how shall we know that the sun shall rise to morrow or any 
thing e<ls>e that is future since they are not yet the objects of our senses? 
are not these sensible things that are Discoverable by our Reason?” 
(p. 436). His answer was that the existence of these items can be 
legitimately inferred, only because the relevant “Phaenomena of Bodys 
are so Inseparably connected that we never see” one without the other 
(p. 438). Such inferences are not only sufficient “to Direct our Conduct 
throughout our Life” (p. 439), but for science as well. Thus the reason 
we know that the blood circulates through the invisible tubes is that “we 
perceive it to be a piece of the same order which we have formerly seen, 
where the whole order was perceivable by our senses” (p. 441). This is 
like the case of tomorrow’s stmrise, only more complex. Since we have 
observed closed systems wherein fluid circulates, we can conclude that 
without such intermediate vessels the blood which flows to the 
extremities “could not flow in such a proportion and not return” . Unless 
there were such vessels we wquld observe the blood “Springing out of 
the Extremitys” (p. 444). The evidence of our senses allows us to 
postulate the mechanism. But there is no such evidence where 
mechanisms are postulated to account for the motion of the muscles.
Young’s conclusion is not merely that we don’t know what the 
mechanism is to account for the dilation of the fleshy part of the muscle 
when we exert our wills, but rather that there might very well be no 
hidden mechanism—that is, any phenomenon which is in principle 
capable of being sensed. He thought that the search for mechanical 
causes here is like the case where someone who has traced out the 
mechanical connections of the parts of a watch finally ends up enquiring 
into the cause of the elasticity of the mainspring. He might form a 
hypothesis about the general cause of elasticity and “foolishly conclude” 
that no other is possible (p. 442). The postulation of a cause in this case 
would be arbitrary, since the phenomenon has no relation to any known 
thing. But, more importantly, we need to stop our enquiries somewhere 
and, if we don’t stop at the connections we can observe, we shall end up 
pursuing the “Invisible mechanism In Infinitum” (p. 443)- He asked 
how we know in the case of the spring “that there is some mechanism in it 
beyond what we see” . He agreed that there is some cause of the elasticity, 
but “how Do we know its a mechanical cause” ? Perhaps it is nothing but
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the “will of God” (p. 445). In the case of the muscle, there is a dilation of 
the “fleshy Belly” of the muscle which follows on the act of the will. Here 
he is willing to allow that “there must be something which Dilates the 
Muscle” , but “whether this something be a Phaenomenon that would be 
perceivable by our senses if more acute or if it be only the act of the will 
is what we know nothing about. i,e, we know not if there be any 
mechanicall cause of the Dilatation of the muscle” (p. 447). Those who 
consider that any observable mechanical cause we give is insufficient, 
and who always seek another, are really demanding a “mechanicall 
connection betwixt the Soul (or if you please the will) & a Living body” . 
They are really leading us “to the mechanicall operation of the Spirit of 
man” (p. 449).
In ‘Of Sensation’ Young made clear his belief that the scientiflc 
demand for causal mechanisms is really no more than the demand that a 
given correlation be subsumed tmder a more general law: “To Explain 
the mechanism of any particular Phaenomenon is to reduce it to some 
common General Law of Bodies own’d to be such By every Body” 
(p. 470). Young asked why there need be mechanisms in this sense for all 
phenomena, for there may be a particular order “only agreeing to two or 
3 bodies” . The particular laws of nervous action may constitute such an 
order. We know that when a certain nerve is stimulated in a healthy 
person such and such a sensation follows. But no one has been able to 
formulate a more general law of nervous action of which these laws of 
specific nerves can be seen as an instance, and therefore “it would not be 
absurd to say that perhaps there is no other mechanism in our 
sensations” . It may be “a particular Law which only agrees to animal 
bodies while connected with a Spirit” (pp. 467-71).
Hence Young combined a rejection of mechanical explanation with a 
belief that special laws apply to bodies in virtue of their being animated 
by an immaterial spirit. These philosophical ideas found fertile soil in 
the mind of Whytt. But there were, no doubt, other important formative 
influences on Whytt. He subsequently studied in London, Paris, Leiden 
(where he is said to have heard the lectures of the then aged Boerhaave), 
finally receiving his doctorate in Medicine at Rheims in 1736. He 
returned to Edinburgh, where he began a private practice in 1737.“*^
Whytt seems to have begun lecturing on the institutes of medicine in 
the mid-1740s after St Clair took ill; he was appointed professor in 1747.
It is commonly accepted that he used Boerhaave’s Institutes as .2^  ^
textbook,'*^ but he m t^  have treated central Boerhaavian doctrines in
W. Seller, ‘Memoir of the life and writings of Robert Whytt, M.D.’, Transactions of the 
Royal Society of Edinburgh 23 (1862); R. K. French, Robert Whytt, the soul and medicine 
(London 1969), chap. i.
French, Robert Whytt, pp. 6-9.
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a very critical way. Whytt’s Essay, published in I75i» contained 
refutations of many of these doctrines, including Boerhaave’s accounts 
of the automatic operations of the heart and lungs. In the Advertisement 
there was an extended attack on “the hypothetical method of philoso­
phizing” where “causes are usually assigned, which not only cannot be 
proved to exist, but which are frequently more intricate and complex 
than even the effects to be explained from them” (Essay, p. vi). It seems 
likely that many readers would have agpn this as a challenge to much of 
the contemporary physiology, pre-eminently that of Boerhaave. Whytt 
called Boerhaave’s explanation of the mechanical operation of the heart a 
‘^hypothesis” which, “however ingenious”, was quite inadequate (p. 28). 
He presented a series of arguments to show its inadequacy. We have seen 
how Boerhaave accounted for the diastolic motion of the heart by 
supposing that the nervous fluids were cut off by the expansion of the 
auricles at the end of systole. But Whytt pointed out that not all the 
icardiac nerves do pass between the auricles and arteries as Boerhaave 
supposed, and therefore the nervous impulse to the heart could not be 
completely cut off. Even if all the nerves did take that route, the external 
coats of the auricles and arteries are soft and fleshy, and it is not plausible 
mat the nerves would be compressed to such an exteijt as to cut off their 
itapulse to the heart. There are no other examples in the body of the kind 
of temporary paralysis of muscles which Boerhaave postulated and, 
Jwhen nerves are cut off by being tied, their effect returns only 
/gradually—not suddenly, as required by Boerhaave’s mechanism for the 
heart. Whytt gave eight arguments based on anatomical and physiologi­
cal evidence to show that Boerhaave’s hypothesis for the mechanical and 
automatic operation of the heart just won’t work.
‘ On the other hand, in the first edition of his Essay, Whytt commended 
the a priori arguments “proposed with great strength and perspicuity by 
my ingenious friend Dr. Porterfield” to show “that the motion of the 
heart and circulation of the blood, are altogether inexplicable upon 
principles purely mechanical” (p. 267). Whytt seems to have been 
referring to those general arguments based on the impossibility of a 
perpetual motion machine which Porterfield had borrowed from Clarke 
and Newton. But, since he claimed to have a general distrust of a priori 
arguments, Whytt added “a variety of arguments a posteriori, chiefly of 
the analogical kind”, which not only show the impossibility of purely 
mechanical explanations of the vital operations, but also that they are 
due to “the immediate energy of the mind or sentient principle 
(P- 268).
To support the view that there can be no perpetual motion in animal 
bodies, Whytt first appealed to the experiments of Stephen Hales, 
indicating that “ in every circulation, the blood loses 9/10 of the
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momentum communicated to it by the left ventricle of the heart” . From 
this Whytt inferred the need for some “cause generating motion” within 
the animal body: “matter, in its own nature inert, is incapable of this” . 
He also appealed to observations of hibernating animals, which “lie in a 
dead inactive state in the winter” but can be revived again at any time 
with a slight stimulus of heat which slowly “excites the heart into 
action” . To support the conclusion that this action cannot be explained 
mechanically, ' '^ y t t  appealed to the principle that a cause cannot 
produce an effect greater than itself. There is “some living principle” in 
these animals, which is capable of generating motion when certain parts 
of the body, such as the heart, are aroused by some slight stimulus 
(pp. 268-9).
While Whytt appealed to experience to show that animals generate 
motion, he also seems to rely on an a priori principle in drawing the 
conclusion that such motion cannot derive from the body itself. He 
assumed with Newton, Clarke, and others that all increase of motion 
must come from mind, and that matter itself is inert and passive. There, is 
no doubt that this is a central thesis of Whytt’s book. It begins with a 
motto from Cicero’s Tusculan disputations which, according to Whytt, 
shows that some of the ancients believed that all animal motions derive 
from “the energy of a living principle wholely distinct from the body” .'*^ 
In Section XI of Whytt’s book there is a passage which suggests that he 
had been following the recent controversy in Europe surrounding La 
Mettrie’s infamous L ’Homme machine. Whytt sees a natural progression 
from the mechanistic principles of Descartes concerning the motions of 
a n i m a l s to the dangerous doctrines of La Mettrie concerning man as a 
machine (pp. 291-2). The latter had been a student of Boerhaave and 
had produced the French translation of Praelectiones academicae.*  ^
Whytt piously closed his own book with the hope that, by showing that 
the motions of our bodies “are all to be referred to the active power of an 
immaterial principle”, he will have shown how “unjustly the study of 
Medicine has been accused of leading men into Scepticism and 
irreligion” (p. 391). Should we not read Whytt’s claim that self­
movement of animals is due to an immaterial principle as a mere a priori 
assumption employed to keep medicine theologically respectable?
However, if we do not go beyond this conclusion, we shall miss what 
is most distinctive in Whytt’s physiological m etaphy^s. When he 
ascribed self-motion as well as other specific properties of animate 
nature to the mind, he was giving a positive account of the phenomena he 
was trying to explain, based on a careful reading of the physiological
See Essay, p. 266, and Cicero, Tusculan disputations, trans. J. E. King (London 1966), 
pp. 64,70. . . ■
'•*’ A. Vartanian, La Mettrie’s L ’Homme machine (Princeton i960), pp. 7511.
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evidence. The key to his analysis of the involuntary motions of animals 
lies in his claim that they depend upon the mind acting as “a sentient 
principle” (p. 271 et passim). We may question the analogies which he 
used to draw his conclusion that the mind is involved in the involuntary 
motions of the body, but in order to understand his theory we need to 
consider with some care the arguments he employed. The core of his 
belief tliat the vital and other involuntary motions of a living body cannot 
be explained mechanically lay in his observation that such motions rely 
on the reaction of muscles to a stimulus. Whytt held that muscular 
motion was caused either by the will or by a stimulus, and that it is the 
latter which causes all the involuntary motions.
In Section X Whytt carefully examined the current theories of 
muscular contraction—those based on the elasticity of the muscle fibres 
themselves, on the elasticity of the unobservable parts of a nervous fluid, 
on chemical explosions, on electricity, etc.—and pointed out that the 
actual reaction of the fibres of living tissue to stimuli is quite different 
from what such theories would lead one to expect (pp. 229ff.). For 
example, the alleged spring-like properties of the parts of the muscle or 
the nervous fluid do not explain why the muscle reacts in so much more 
violent a way when it is lightly touched with a needle than when it is 
struck much harder with a blimt object. Why should a spring react in a 
violent way to acids “any more than the mildest milk, or oil of almonds” 
(p. 231)? We observe no such reaction in springs large enough for us to 
see. To those who held that muscular contraction results from a chemical 
explosion or perhaps from “the peculiar energy of some very subtile 
ethereal or electrical matter residing in the nerves”, Whytt replied that 
none of these hypotheses explains why the muscles react to certain 
stimuli and not others. Gimpowder requires fire and “electrical effluvia” 
require a charged object: but neither is necessary for the stimulation of a 
muscle. It makes no difference “whether the stimulating substances be 
electrics per se, or now-electrics” (p. 236). Whytt went on, in the first 
edition, to attack the view of Haller (as expressed in his notes to 
Boerhaave) that the spontaneous motion of muscles is due to some latent 
power in the muscles themselves. In this opening shot in his important 
dispute with Haller about the cause of muscular movement, Whytt calls 
this postulation of a latent power “a refuge of ignorance” (p. 239). He 
clearly thought, at least initially, that his own explanation, unlike that of 
Haller, was based on a principle of which we all have direct knowledge. 
Finally, Whytt considered the general view of those who say that the 
“Author of nature” has endowed the muscle fibres with some matter 
superior to ordinary matter. Here alone, Whytt’s reply seems to be based 
purely on a priori considerations, when he argues that to claim that 
matter “can, of itself, by any modification of its parts, be rendered
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capable of sensation, or of generating motion, is equally absurd, as to 
ascribe to it a power of thinking” (pp. 241-2).
I Whytt thought that any particular response could be explained by 
ascribing it to “an active sentient p r in c ip l e  animating these fibres” . 
Whytt’s sentient principle must be understood as the source of an 
inherent sensibility in the nerves of the muscles which causes them to 
react in determinate ways to the stimuli which are applied to them. 
Whytt thought that this could explain why the application of a stimulus 
to a bare muscle produces “ instead of only one contraction lasting for a 
considerable time, several contractions and relaxations alternately 
, succeeding each other, which become gradually weaker, and are 
repeated after longer intervals, as the force of the irritating cause is 
diminished” . When first stimulated, the sentient principle “determines 
/the influence of the nerves” into the muscle fibres “more strongly than 
/  usual” , in order to remove the pain. However, as the feeling of pain 
diminishes, the muscle reacts less often; indeed “if by one or two 
contractions the irritating cause be thrown off, and, together with it, the 
disagreeable sensation removed, the muscle will return to its former state 
; of rest” (pp. 242-3). Such contractions are not like those of a vibrating 
I body which “performs its vibrations in equal times, whether it be acted 
upon by a stronger or a weaker force” (p. 247). Thus the particular 
I nature of the response in removing the irritating cause indicates that 
, what is operating is a sensible principle.
In ascribing the response to a sentient principle, Whytt was not merely 
making the point that the response is generally the most useful one under 
the circumstances. This was also a common observation among the 
mechanist writers whom he opposed, and like those writers he held that 
the involuntary motions of the body could under certain circumstances 
turn out to be quite harmful (pp. 289-90). Rather, his central point is 
that the particular nature of the observed response becomes intelligible 
when it is seen as a reaction to a pain or uneasiness. For example, “if 
stimuli excite the muscles of animals into contraction by acting upon 
them, rather as sentient than mere mechanical or material organs, it is 
easy to see, why the mildest aliment is apt to excite vomiting when the 
coats of the stomach are inflamed” (p. 256). Here the sensibility of the 
stomach due to the inflammation explains its violent response to the mild 
food. The muscle reacts in direct response to the feeling'. Similarly, the 
response of a muscle is very different when the feeling is constant from 
what it is where the contraction of the muscle gives some degree of relief. 
Thus “the causes which produce the erection of th t penis, though they be 
generally excited into action by the stimulus of the ^ eed, yet do not act by 
alternate fits, because the erection has no effect to lessen the stimulating 
cause” . On the other hand, musculi ejaculatoris seminis act through 
alternate contractions and relaxations because through such actions the
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irritation is gradually relieved. These muscles relax for a moment 
because each contraction briefly lessens the uneasy sensation of the 
stimulus (p. 261). In general, we can understand the nature of muscular 
action if we consider the muscles to be “endued with feeling, and 
animated by a Sentient principle” (p. 369).
Whytt’s sentient principle explains animal motions as a direct 
response to the degree of pain that is felt. His most important 
contribution to physiology is generally considered to be his work on 
reflex action. Through careful experimentation he identifled the spinal 
cord as the locus of the reflex in the limbs of the frog, and discovered that 
there is a period of inhibitioh-after the frog has been decapitated in which 
this reflex is delayed. But his explanation of this phenomenon may seem 
to be more remarkable than the phenomenon itself. In his Physiological 
essays (1755) Whytt wrote that “the great pain occasioned by cutting off 
the head rendered the animal for some time insensible when its toes were 
wounded” . Thus the frog’s mind is too preoccupied with the loss of its 
head to react to the relatively minor pain of its toes being pinched! In 
support, Whytt appealed to Hippocrates’ principle that “a, greater pain 
destroys, in a considerable degree, the feeling of a lesser one” .'*^
Whytt collapsed the distinction which Boerhaave had made between 
the purely automatic motions of the body and those which arise from 
some “uneasy sensation” . For Whytt, all muscular motion must be seen 
as an attempt to get rid of some “pain or uneasy sensation” .'** This was
•*’ Whytt, Physiological essays, third edn. (Edinburgh 1766), p. 98. See F. Fearing, Reflex 
action (Cambridge, Mass. 1930), pp. 74-83; G. Canguilhem, La Formation du concept de reflexe 
aux XVIIe et X V IIIe siecles (Paris 1977), pp. 101-7 et passim.
■** Essay, p. 243. Cf. pp. 288-9, where Whytt also writes of “a disagreeable perception”, and 
likens the sentient principle to the moral sense “whence we approve of some actions, and 
disapprove of others, almost instantly, and without any previous reasoning about their fitness 
or unfimess”. In Medicine as culture: Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment (Ph.D., 
University of London 1984), Christopher Lawrence concludes from this that Whytt “was 
drawing on the moral philosophy of Hutcheson or his followers to develop a new conception of 
the body” (p. 232). Lawrence has misunderstood the significance and context of the parallel 
which Whytt drew. He bases his interpretation on Hutcheson’s assertion that desires arise in us 
to obtain an agreeable sensation when we apprehend a good object, or “to prevent the uneasy 
Sensation when it is evil” (Francis Hutcheson, An essay on the nature and conduct of the passions 
and affections (London 1728), p. 7). But there is nothing uniquely Hutchesonian about the 
concept of uneasy sensation. We have already seen the basic idea present in Boerhaave under the 
heading ‘molesta perceptio’ (rendered as ‘uneasy sensation’ in the English translation of the early 
1740s). It was Locke who suggested that “the chief if not only spur to Humane Industry and 
Action is uneasiness” (Essay, II. xx. 6). Indeed, Hutcheson was probably criticizing Locke 
when he wrote against those who held that desire is “Uneasy Sensation upon the Absence of any 
Good”. According to Hutcheson, “Desire is . . . distinct from Uneasiness” (see D. F. Norton, 
‘Hutcheson’s moral realism’, Jottma/ of the history of philosophy 23 (1985), at p. 401). The same 
criticism was levelled explicitly against Locke in Carmichael’s dictates on pneumatology at 
Glasgow C.1711-12 (see C. M. Shepherd, Philosophy and science in the arts curriculum of the 
Scottish universities in the seventeenth century (Ph.D., University of Edinburgh 1975), p. 134).
The significance of the parallel which Whytt draws between the operation of his own sentient 
principle and the moral sense lies in the claim that both operate without reason and reflection. 
The passage occurs in a context where Whytt is rejecting the Stahlian system which maintains
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the principle operating when, under normal conditions, the heart 
contracts in reaction to the stimulus of the returning blood from the 
veins: the motions of the heart result from the fact that the nerves of the 
heart muscles are “highly sensible, and the stimulus is immediately 
applied to them” (Essay, p. 311). Boerhaave had rejected just this 
explanation by denying that there is a distinct sensation in the muscles of 
the heart; he had noted that if the distinct motions of the muscles were 
accompanied by sensation we would be in constant pain from their 
continuous operation. There is, in fact, only a general feeling of pain 
when the tissues of the heart muscle become inflamed (Lectures, 301.6). 
As we have seen, Boerhaave tried to explain the motion of the heart 
according to purely mechanical principles which operate independently 
of the mind.
Whytt argued that his own accotmt of these phenomena was superior 
to that of the mechanists for two reasons: it avoided multiplying causes 
unnecessarily, and it explained the phenomena in terms of a principle the 
properties of which are directly experienced. According to Whytt, the 
mechanists explained the reaction of different organs of the body to 
stimuli by means of different mechanisms. Thus on groimds of 
simplicity alone his explanation of all these motions as resulting from 
variations in the degree of feeling was superior (Essay, p. 265; cf. p. 4). 
Perhaps even more importantly, while the mechanists and materialists 
ascribed the movement of muscles from a stimulus to a “hidden property 
of their fibres . . .  or other unknown cause”, he claimed to show how 
these movements are “easily and naturally accounted for, from the 
power and energy of a known sentient p r in c ip l e ”  (p. 265). While we 
may lack theoretical knowledge of how the mind affects the body, “we 
know from experience, that it feels, is endued with sensation, and has a 
power of moving the body” (p. 276).
Unlike Yoimg, Whytt did not deny that there was some “material 
cause in the brain, nerves, and muscular fibres” which the mind uses “as 
its instrument” for putting the muscles in motion. But he did argue that 
such speculations were imnecessary, in “a science already labouring 
imder too many hypotheses” (pp. 325-6). vJ
There was an obvious objection, at least from the point of view of 
Boerhaavian physiology, to Whytt’s claim that sentience is the principle 
operating in vital and other involimtary motions. For we are commonly 
not conscious either of the stimulus or the “exertion of the mind’s power”
that everything occurs in the body through a rational principle. Like the mechanists, Whytt is 
concerned to establish that basic life processes occur spontaneously. Elsewhere he stressed that 
moral actions must be accompanied with a consciousness of freedom, and that in this respect 
they are entirely different from the actions from an uneasy sensation which control our vital 
functions. See p. 287 below.
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in producing the response (p. 299). In breathing, for example, we are not 
ordinarily conscious of the stimulus, though we are sometimes conscious 
of an effort of the mind in producing the action. (Indeed this action is 
clearly sometimes volimtary.) In other cases, such as the widening of the 
pupil of the eye, we can be conscious of the stimulus— t^he increase in the 
intensity of the light—but not the effort of the mind in moving the 
relevant muscles. In the case of the heart, we are not normally conscious 
of either the stimulus or the supposed action of the mind in producing the 
contraction of the muscles. Is not our lack of consciousness a clear 
indication that these actions are not performed by the mind? Whytt tried 
to answer this in Section X of his Essay .
He suggested that our imconsciousness of the stimuli of our vital 
motiofts may be due to the fact that we have become habituated to them 
and that they are relatively gentle (p. 292). Just as we cease to be aware of 
the impressions of external objects when they become familiar to us, so 
we become unconscious of those internal stimuli which have affected us 
since birth. We always have before us a large number of impressions, 
though most are so lost among stronger and more novel ones “as to 
escape our attention and memory” (p. 294n.). But we do become 
conscious of them when they affect us with greater strength than usual. 
For example, “the sensation arising from the impetuous course of the 
blood through the pulmonary vessels” (p. 294)—which is, according to 
Whytt, the stimulus for the motion of the limgs—is normally “very 
slight as not to be felt or attended to” . But it becomes “very perceptible” 
to a person suffering from an asthmatic attack, when it is “accompanied 
with the most painful anxiety” (pp. 295-6).
Similarly, Whytt denied that our lack of consciousness of any effort in 
the production of the action is proof that it is not produced by the mind. 
He assumed that anyone would agree that a motion which arises from an 
idea must be produced by the mind, and went on to note that such actions 
are often performed without any consciousness: “As the erection of the 
penis often proceeds from lascivious thoughts, it must be ascribed, in 
these cases at least, to the mind, notwithstanding our being equally 
imconscious of her influence exerted here, as in producing the 
contraction of the heart” (p. 301). Here one is aware of the idea 
(memory, etc.) which produces the effort of the mind, but not of the 
effort itself. Whytt also pointed out that the heartbeat can be increased 
by certain ideas (e.g. a frightening thought). In such a case the mind 
influences the motion of the heart, but we are not “sensible of its power 
being directed to that end” (p. 303). Even voluntary motions “are many 
times performed, when we are insensible of the power of the will exerted 
in their production”—for example, when one walks while deep in 
thought, or while talking to another person.
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Whytt’s claim that the vital motions are performed by an unconscious 
action of the mind might make one think that he would be quite open to 
Porterfield’s suggestion that these actions are voluntary. In fact, quite 
the opposite. While, in the first edition of his Essay in 1751, Whytt’s 
remarks on Porterfield’s theory were all commendatory, he distanced his 
views from those of Porterfield in the second edition in 1763. One factor 
may have been Porterfield’s own criticism of Whytt in his Treatise on the 
eye in 1759. In 1763 Whytt in turn criticized Porterfield, “a subtile 
defender of the Stahlian doctrine” .'*’
In his first edition Whytt had criticized the view of the Stahlians that 
the mind acts as “a rational agent” in bringing about the vital and other 
involuntary motions:
We think it a very clear point, that the mind does not, as Dr. S tahl and others 
would persuade us, preside over, regulate, and continue the vital motions, or, 
upon extraordinary occasions, exert its power in redoubling them, from any 
rational views, or from a consciousness that the body’s welfare demands her care 
in these particulars.
He denied that the mind can rationally control the heartbeat “when life 
is endangered by the too violent circulation of the blood” . Rational 
action must take place with consciousness, and, since we have no 
consciousness of bringing about the vital motions, they cannot be 
performed with reason. According to Whytt, when one acts rationally 
one compares different alternatives, and “in consequence of this 
comparison” makes a certain choice. But the comparison of alternatives 
is a comparison of ideas, and “we cannot but be sensible of the ideas 
formed within us by the internal operations of our minds” . Unlike 
sensations, ideas exist only as long as we are conscious of them 
(pp. 285-7).
In his first edition Whytt had briefly dismissed the view that our 
inability to control the muscles of the heart was due to their having 
become, like the motion of the eyes, “ in a manner necessary through long 
habit” (p. 286). In the second edition he specifically identified this 
argument as that of Porterfield.^® Whytt argued for an essential 
difference between muscles like those which control the movements of 
our eyes and those like the heart:
But although custom may enable us to perform some actions with surprising 
facility and little or no attention, yet it will not render the motions of muscles 
absolutely involuntary, which were originally voluntary.—There is no instance 
in the human body of any muscle, whose motion can be fairly proved to have
Whytt, An essay on the vital and other involuntary motions of animals, 2nd edn. (Edinburgh 
1763), P- 343n.
Essay (1763), p. 341, paraphrasing from Treatise on the eye, vol. 2, p. 149.
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been voluntary in the beginning of life, that has by custom or habit become so fair 
independent on the will, as to be in no degree under its immediate controul. 
{Essay (1763), p. 341)
Thus, while I cannot help but move my two eyes together, I still can 
decide the speed at which to move them, and the direction. I have no 
such control over the motions of my heart, or the peristaltic motion of my 
stomach and guts. Thus there is no reason to think that the actions of 
these muscles were originally voluntary.
Whytt also took issue with Porterfield’s claim that while there was no 
physical necessity involved in actions performed by custom and habit, 
there is a “moral necessity” . According to Whytt, morally necessary 
actions must be sufficiently voluntary to allow one to praise or blame the 
agent, and in order for this to be legitimate they “must be attended with a 
consciousness of liberty” . This consciousness is lacking in the case of our 
heartbeat, or the peristaltic motions of our stomach or guts. In his 
Pathological Lectures Whytt told his students that Porterfield’s 
argument that the mind is not conscious of its volitions in producing 
such motions was based on a “metaphysical Subterfuge” .^ *
But Whytt’s chief objection to Porterfield’s explanation of our lack of 
control over the vital motions was based on the fact that there is a much 
more plausible explanation. Even voluntary muscles come to move 
involuntarily when their “fibres or nerves are irritated” {Essay (1763)5 
p. 342). We find throughout the animal body that stimuli produce 
involuntary motion through an irritation of their sensitive parts. This is 
clearly the explanation for the fact that the vital and natural motions of 
our visceral organs are carried out without any sort of voluntary control.
While Porterfield and Whytt both rejected the Boerhaavian or 
Cartesian theory which denied that the mind operates in governing the 
vital and natural operations of the body, their positive accounts are very 
different. Whytt’s view is that the mind
in producing the vital and other involuntary motions, does not act as a rational, 
but as a sentient principle; which, without reasoning upon the matter, is as 
necessarily determined by an imgrateful sensation or stimulus affecting the 
organs, to exert its power, in bringing about these motions, as is a balance, while, 
from mechanical laws, it preponderates to that side where the greatest weight 
prevails. {Essay, p. 289)
Like the mechanists, Whytt held that those motions which take place 
independently of the conscious will take place necessarily. They follow 
as a “necessary and immediate consequence of the disagreeable
V EUL, MS. Gen. 745D, fol. 4. The lecture notes are bound with notes in the same hand as 
notes from the midwifery lectures of Thomas Young. The attribution to Whytt is made in the 
manuscript catalogue, and given the contents this seems to me probable.
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perception” . Neither the means nor the goal of such actions is chosen by 
the mind which performs them. Rather, the Deity has so formed the 
mind-body connection that “in consequence of a stimulus affecting any 
organ, or of an uneasy perception in it” our minds “immediately excite 
such motions . . .  as may be most proper to remove the irritating cause” 
(p. 288).
Porterfield questioned the significance of ascribing body motions to 
the “Energy and active Power of the Mind” if those motions occur 
necessarily.^^ He noted that according to Whytt the vital and natural 
motions of the body are “altogether involtmtary” and are “not subjected 
to the Will” ; that in performing these supposed actions the mind “has no 
Views, . . . proposes no End, . . . acts without Choice” and “without 
Preference or Election” . Porterfield argued that there is no point in 
saying that such motions are “caused by the Mind” if, in spite of the 
addition of sentience, they come about “by a Law established by the All­
wise Creator” (Treatise, vol. 2, p. 162).
It is tempting, when one thinks about Porterfield’s criticism of Whytt, 
to conclude that, because he held that the vital motions occur 
necessarily, there is essentially no difference between his physiological 
views and those of Boerhaave. In fact, in a certain respect Porterfield’s 
physiology is far closer to that of Boerhaave than that of Whytt. As we 
have seen, Porterfield no less than Boerhaave described the body itself as 
a hydraulic machine. Whytt, on the other hand, held that one “must not 
consider the body as an inanimate hydraulic Machine which stops when 
one pipe is obstructed, but as composed of exquisitely sensible tubes” . 
Unlike Porterfield and Boerhaave, Whytt held that the basic principle of 
animal motion is feeling.
Thq difference between Porterfield’s and Whytt’s explanations of the 
motions of animal bodies comes out clearly in their differing accounts of 
the motions of muscles separated from the brain. In the last section of his 
Essay Whytt had presented a remarkable range of cases describing “the 
motions observed in the muscles of animals after death, or their 
separation from the body” . He realized that some would think that such 
phenomena show that muscles operate independently of the soul or 
sentient principle, but he argued that this is not the case. Since muscles 
separated from the rest of the body continue to operate in the same way 
that they do in the body, they “bespeak a feeling, and cannot be 
explained without it” . Unless we assert that feeling is a property of 
matter we must admit that the sentient principle continues to operate in 
them (Essay, pp. 389-90). Whytt claimed that this is a conclusion 
supported “by the strongest analogy” (p. 388). But Porterfield argued
Treatise on the eye, vol. 2, p. 162; cf. Whytt, Essay, p. 302,
‘Whytt’s clinical lectures 1762-1764’: RCPE, MS. Whytt 2, fol. 2. Italics are mine.
John P. Wright
that Whytt’s account of such motions was less plausible than that of 
Albrecht von Haller (Treatise, vol. 2, pp. 165-6). Indeed, as we have 
seen, Porterfield himself argued that such transient and short-lived 
motions could be explained in a purely mechanical way. In the second 
edition of his Essay Whytt responded by pointing out that some of these 
motions were hardly ephemeral:
if the motions of a viper’s heart for three days after its head has been cut off, and 
those of the heart of a tortoise for six months after the loss of its brain, may be 
owing to a mechanical power resulting from their particular structure, why may 
not the motions of the heart in these as well as all other animals, from the 
beginning to the end of life, be owing to mechanism alone} (Essay (1763), 
p. 43 m.)
Whytt argued that there is an inherent inconsistency in a view which 
demands the volvmtary control of vital actions during the lifetime of the 
organism, but is willing to allow that they can take place purely 
mechanically after destruction of the brain.
Hpwever, as Whytt himself recognized, his own view that the motions 
of separated muscles are under the control of the sentient principle was 
not itself without problems. In Section XI he had favoured the 
hypothesis that “the involuntary motions in man are not owing to a 
principle distinct froni the rational mind”, on two grounds— t^hat the 
motions of voluntary muscles can themselves become involuntary, and 
that in man it is clearly the same principle which is conscious of thinking 
and of feeling (pp. 282-5). In general, Whytt favoured the view that the 
soul is a unity. But, as we have just seen, he also maintained that the soul 
or living principle does not leave the body immediately after the brain is 
destroyed and conscious function ceases. Does this not show the 
independence of the thinking and sentient principles? Moreover, in 
holding that the soul is responsible for the motions of separated muscles, 
Whytt implied that it continues to act in spatially discrete nerves. Should 
he not have concluded that there were different souls in the discrete 
parts? But Whytt argued that experiments with hibernating animals 
showed that the soul acts independently in different parts, even though 
the brain itself is dormant. Moreover, anyone who examines the 
structure and function of the brain will find implausible the view that the 
mind occupies a single indivisible point. Whytt cited an impressive list of 
authorities—including Gassendi, Newton, and Clarke—who held that a 
single unified soul can exist in extended parts. Just as the Deity can act 
independently in different parts of space without in any way losing unity 
or indivisibility, so there can be independent operation of the same 
unified soul in the scattered parts of animals after death. Any residual 
problems with this idea he put down to our ignorance of “the nature of
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an immaterial substance, its manner of existing, and way of acting upon, 
or being present with the body” (pp. 377-84).
Whytt’s view that the motions of separate muscles must be due to a 
soul or sentient principle took on a special significance in the dispute 
with Haller, which broke out after the publication of Whytt’s Essay. 
Haller supported an even more radical form of automatism than his 
teacher Boerhaave. In the notes to his edition of Boerhaave, Haller had 
asserted in opposition to his teacher that “the heart is moved by some 
unknown cause, which neither depends upon the brain nor the arteries, 
but lays concealed in the very structure of the heart itself” .^ '* Like 
Whytt, Haller held that the motion of the heart was due to the irritability 
of the heart muscle in response to the return of venous b l oo d . Bu t  
Haller claimed that irritability is due to a “physical cause which depends 
upon the arrangement of the ultimate particles” of the animal gluten of 
the muscles—though he maintained that, like gravity, the actual cause of 
the motion is not perceivable (‘Sensible and irritable parts’, p. 692). Like 
Boerhaave, Haller asserted that there is a mechanical cause of the motion 
of the heart, though he refused to speculate on its exact nature. He 
also maintained that there can be no feeling without consciousness 
(pp. 677-8). But he went further than Boerhaave in maintaining that the 
I basic motion of the heart and other such organs is not only independent 
of the mind, but also independent of the whole nervous system. T  aken in 
this context, Whytt’s view that the vital and other involxmtary motions of 
animals are caused by the sentient principle came to have a twofold 
significance. On the one hand, it signified the dependence of all motions 
of muscles on feeling; on the other, it signified the general dependence of 
such motions on the nervous system. Whytt’s dispute with Haller 
touched on both issues.^®
Much of the argument on both sides turned on the question of the 
correct explanation of the motions of muscles which were cut off from 
the influence of the brain. Haller argued that these depended on the 
irritability of the muscle fibres due to their own vis insita, while Whytt ■ 
argued that irritability depended on the nervous power which remained 
in their nerves. Each brought an impressive array of experiments to 
support his view. Whytt distinguished the metaphysical issues involved 
from the issue concerning the anatomical source of the living principle.
”  Albrecht von Haller, ‘A dissertation on the sensible and irritable parts of animals’, with 
introduction by Owsei Temkin, Bulletin of the history of medicine 4 (1936), at p. 694. This is a 
reprint of the anonymous English 1755 translation of Haller’s De partibus corporis humani 
sensilibus et irritabilibus] the Latin original was published in Gottingen in 1753.
”  Haller, First lines of physiology [1786], reprinted with an introduction by L. King (New 
York 1955), sec. 103.
For a good recent account of this dispute see F. Duchesneau, La physiologic des lumieres 
(The Hague 1982), chap. 6; also French, Robert Whytf, chap. 6.
The latter issue can be decided entirely on the basis of experiment. In the 
last edition of his Physiological essays in 1766, Whytt noted that even 
someone who held that the powers of the nerves are “owing to the 
particular disposition and arrangement of the matter of which they are 
composed” could adopt his view on the relation of irritability to 
sensibility (pp. 244-5). He thought that a good portion of his dispute 
with Haller could be settled by an agreement that life is due to a single 
nervous power which can be retained for a limited time in the nerves of 
the muscles after they are separated from the rest of the body.
Nevertheless it is also true that much of the dispute hung on the 
differing conceptions of mind adopted by Whytt and Haller. Haller’s 
most important metaphysical challenge to Whytt’s view was clearly 
stated in his 1753 paper De partibus corporis humani sensilibus et 
irritabilibus. He noted that Whytt had “found himself obliged to admit 
the divisibility of the soul, which he believes to be separable into as many 
parts as the body” . Haller observed that when the intestines were 
quickly removed from a small animal and cut into four or eight pieces, all 
moved separately and responded individually to an irritation. He did not 
think it made sense to maintain, with Whytt, that the soul continues to 
operate in all of them independently. In general.
The soul is a being which is conscious of itself, represents to itself the body to 
which it belongs, and by means of that body the whole universe. I am myself, 
and not another, because that which is called I, is changed by every thing that 
happens to my body and the parts belonging to it. . . . But a finger cut off from 
my hand, or a bit of flesh from my leg, has no connexion with me. I am not 
sensible of any of its changes, they can neither commimicate to me idea nor 
sensation; wherefore it is not inhabited by my soul nor by any part of it; if it was, 
I should certainly be sensible of its changes. (‘Sensible and irritable parts’, 
pp. 677-8)
In this discussion Haller identified self and soul, and denied that there 
can be activity of soul without consciousness. The soul cannot be 
operating in the separated muscles of the body as Whytt claimed, for it 
does not feel the irritation of those muscles.
In response to the first part of Haller’s criticism, Whytt repeated his 
claim that the soul need not be divisible, even though it continues to exist 
in the scattered parts: an “immaterial substance cannot, like the body, be 
divided by the anatomical knife, and . . . the indivisibility of the soul 
does not depend on the unity of that body which it animates, but on its 
own particular nature” (Physiological essays, p. 242). Unfortunately 
Whytt never really explains the significance of this unity of the soul itself 
after all conscious functions cease, beyond what he had already set forth 
in his Essay.
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In response to the second part of Haller’s objection, Whj^t made an 
important distinction between the nature of feeling as it exists in the 
periphery of the nervous system and as it exists in the brain. He held that 
it is probable that, even in living animals, the soul is “present every 
where in the body”, and that “there may be some kind of feeling or 
sensation excited in the nerve itself” which causes the response to a 
stimulus (p. I55n.). Whytt carefully distinguished the location of 
“simple sensation” from that of sensation accompanied with conscious­
ness. Thus the soul “can only taste in the tongue, smell in the nose, see in 
the eyes, hear in the ears, and feel hunger in the stomach” . On the other 
hand, it exercises the power of “reflex consciousness and reason” only in . 
the brain. Consciousness is due to a “reflex act, by which a person knows 
his thoughts or sensations to be his own” . When communication with 
the brain is cut off, the part of the body can still retain its power of 
sensation through the peripheral nerves and so react for a time to stimuli. 
But it is no longer able to communicate that sensation to the brain where 
it can become conscious (pp. 155—8). In a footnote to the final edition of 
his Essay Whjrtt referred to the sensation which is retained in the parts 
of muscles separated from the rest of the nervous system as “some kind of 
feeling or simple sensation (such as oysters or other animals of the lowest 
class, who have no brain are endued with)” (Essay (1763), p. 433n.).
The metaphysical issue between Whytt and Haller turns largely on 
their different conceptions of the soul. For Haller, like Boerhaave, the 
essence of the soul is to be conscious. For Whytt, the soul is essentially 
that which gives life to the body and which is only conscious in so far as it 
performs its operations in the brain. As we have seen, Whytt thought 
that his contemporaries rejected his view of the soul partly because they 
still retained Cartesian principles, and partly because they had become 
too enamoured of mechanical reasoning in physiology. Perhaps Haller’s 
imwillingness actually to give a mechanical accoimt of the vis insita 
blunted the force of the second part of this criticism, but the first 
remained entirely relevant to their dispute. Whytt rejected that form of 
Cartesian dualism which maintained that the vital and other involuntary 
motions of animals are independent of the thinking principle—the view 
which was most forcefully set out by Haller. In his account of the soul or 
mind Whytt reaffirmed its essence as the principle of life and maintained 
the centrality of feeling as the root of all life processes.
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V. C U L L E N ’S GEOGRAPHY OF THE M IN D
In 1766, after Whytt’s early death, William Cullen resigned his position 
as professor of Chemistry at the University of Edinburgh, and was
appointed professor of the Theory of Medicine. Over the next seven 
years he gave five year-long courses of lectures on physiology.”  In 1772 
he published his Institutions of Medicine, containing only short 
propositions, which were discussed at length in his lectures. In the latter, 
Cullen considered the physiological views of a number of his contempor­
aries, especially Whytt, Haller, and Jerome Gaub. His own views are not 
always easy to discover, because he employed a sceptical style of 
reasoning, balancing one contemporary doctrine against another. But, 
like Hume, Cullen was an academic sceptic who used this type of 
reasoning to reach conclusions which he thought highly probable He 
provided a dialectical synthesis of his predecessors’ views by applying 
what Hume had called “mental geography” (E. 13)—that is, through a 
careful analysis of the powers of the mind. It was through such an 
analysis of sensation and volition, albeit one which rested partly on 
Cartesian principles, that Cullen showed the extent and nature of the 
interaction between mind and body.
As I indicated in section I, Cullen regarded this mutual interaction as 
of major concern to physiology. In what appears to be a supplementary 
private note on his lectures from the mid-1760s, he wrote that the 
problem of the action of the mind on the body reduces to the problem 
“how one State of the body or of one part can affea another part of it” . 
He identified the mental states or faculties as “thought. Intellect & will” . 
The reason they had been generally ascribed to “a Substance very 
different from our bodies” is that the mechanism by which they are 
produced “is not <at> all obvious” . Nevertheless, he pointed out that 
they are clearly “ inseparable from some conditions in the body” . Cullen 
adopted the doctrine of two substances and their connection espoused by 
Boerhaave and Haller, who had never been “ Suspected of irreligion”, 
but this dualism and the problems connected with it were of little 
intellectual concern to him. The important problem concerning the 
influence of mind on body was a problem of how certain states of 
the brain—namely mental ones—affect those of other organs such as the 
heart: “This is a problem to the Solution of which we may hope to 
attain.””
Whytt and Porterfield had opposed Boerhaave’s view that the essence 
of mind or soul is to be conscious. It is therefore striking to discover that, 
in spite of his alleged opposition to the system of Boerhaave, Cullen
Thomson, Life of Cullen (note 6 above), vol. I, p. 458.
5* On Cullen’s recommendation of “the slow consenting Academic Doubt” , see J. R. R. 
Christie, ‘Ether and the science of chemistry’, in Conceptions of ether, ed. G. N. Cantor and 
M. J. S. Hodge (Cambridge 1981), esp. p. 92. Christie ties this academic scepticism with that 
of Hume, stressing the importance of a cautious acceptance of hypotheses—especially that of 
the aether—for both thinkers.
»  ‘Lectures on physiology’: RCPE, MS. Cullen 16(1), preliminary folios.
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followed him in holding that consciousness characterizes what is mental. 
This is clear from his analysis of the concept of sensation. In his lectures 
in the fall of 1770, Cullen said he followed Hume in distinguishing 
sensations from ideas—that is, from the thought of “an Object absent 
arising from Reminiscence” . A sensation is a thought which arises 
directly from an “external Impression or certain other Changes in the 
Body” . Cullen went beyond Hume (and Whytt) in carefully distinguish­
ing sensations from impressions—that is, from the motions in the body 
which are their causes.*® Cullen defined “sensation” in general as “the 
Mind’s being conscious of any changes in the State of the body, or more 
nearly of the Nervous System” (fols. 89-90, my italics). In proposition 
49 of his Institutions he asserted (with Haller) that the mind can have or 
attend to only one sensation at a time, thus rejecting Whytt’s suggestion 
that the mind can have a number of unconscious sensations at any given 
moment. Finally, in his 1770 lecture on proposition 122, he stated 
plainly that “to say there is Sensation without Consciousness is to me 
almost a Contradiction in Terms” (fol. 160).
Unlike Whytt, Cullen held that processes of the body can take place 
purely automatically—that is, without being accompanied by any mental 
state. Herein we see the significance of his distinction between sensations 
and impressions. In proposition 80 he asserted that “certain impressions 
and certain states of the body . . . may . . .  act on the nervous system 
without producing any sensation” ; and in proposition 122, that “many 
impressions have their affects without sensation and volition” . Indeed 
he held that fundamentally our vital and natural motions are of this 
nature. In proposition 119 he maintained that “the motions of the heart 
and arteries, of the organs of respiration, of the stomach, intestines and 
perhaps other parts” are caused by “certain internal impressions . .  . 
which produce no sensation, nor motions of which we are conscious 
except when exercised in an unusual manner” .®' Cullen did accept 
Whytt’s view (opposed to Haller) that the motions of muscles are always
After distinguishing sensations from ideas, Cullen wrote: “ In this point I follow David 
Hume; he indeed uses the Term Impression instead of Sensation, but I employ Impression in 
another place I think more properly, nor would Impression convey the whole meaning of 
Sensation, but only as far as it arises from the body.” (NLS Cullen, fol. 80). On Whytt’s 
interchangeable use of ‘impression’ and ‘sensation’ see sect. IV above.
In an article which is widely referred to (‘The nervous system and society in the Scottish 
Enlightenment’, in Natural order: historical studies of scientific culture, ed. B. Barnes and S. 
Shapin (Beverly Hills 1979), 19-40), C. Lawrence cites this passage to support the conclusion 
that Cullen “retained all the characteristics of Whytt’s sentient principle—purposeful action, 
coordinating ability, and, most importantly, unconscious feeling—without introducing second 
substances into physiology” (p. 26, my italics). I can see how this passage could be read as 
Lawrence reads it when taken out of the context of the rest of the Institutions, but I cannot see 
how it can be so read in the context of propositions 80, 122, and numerous comments in the 
lecture notes. For reasons set out in the last section I also consider quite misleading Lawrence’s 
view that Whytt thought the vital motions are carried out through any “purposeful action” .
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due to some form of nervous power, and he stressed that in the living 
body they require a constant energy from the brain (props. 96, 97).®* 
However, he drew an entirely different metaphysical conclusion from 
Whytt’s. For Cullen, the fact that “some of the Functions of our System 
can be performed without Sensation or Volition” gives “a strong Proof 
of the Brain’s being a Mechanical Organ” (NLS Cullen, fol. 1465 cf. 
Institutions, prop. 116).
In proposition 122 Cullen balanced this against the claim that the 
mechanism of the brain is insufficient “without being united with a 
sentient principle or mind that is constantly present in the living 
System” . He argued for this partly on epistemological grounds, because 
“the mechanism of the brain suited to its several functions is not at all 
perceived” . Unlike Boerhaave, Cullen did not think that mental states 
are, for practical purposes, reducible to their mechanical causes. But he 
also gave a more positive reason: very few of the functions of the brain 
are “carried out without sensation and volition” (prop. 122). Here he 
appears to agree with Whytt’s claim that the sentient principle operates 
throughout the body. We need to consider how this is reconcilable with 
Cullen’s assertions about vital and natural motions which we considered 
in the last paragraph.
While Cullen appealed to the authority of Whytt in support of a 
sentient principle, he took issue with Whytt’s view that sensation takes 
place in the peripheral nervous system, apart from the brain itself 
(NLM, II, fol. 243). But their different accounts of the operation of the 
sentient principle go deeper than that. Since Cullen identified mental 
functions with conscious ones, he held that basic life functions can go on 
independently of the mind. At the same time he criticized Whytt for 
holding with Boerhaave that our visceral fvmctions are carried on with an 
absolute necessity,®  ^ without any kind of influence by the conscious 
mind. For Cullen, the sentient principle influences our basic life 
functions, but as an independently identifiable principle whose effects 
on those functions can be determined by experience. While he began 
from a basic acceptance of what I earlier called ftmction dualism, Cullen 
asked himself just how those states of the nervous system which are 
mental interact with those on which our basic life functions depend.
Cullen regularly returned to what he called the “ Stahlian contro-
Cullen seems to adopt the position suggested by Whytt in the last edition of the 
Physiological essays, discussed in section IV above. . . .  • u-
“But to understand Boerhave you must observe this Application of these Doctrines to his 
System in his Definition of Disease, where he says the Consideration of the Mind is to be 
neglected. . . .  He explains this still more particularly . . . where he expressly says Omne hoc
pendet &c.----- mechanica dispositio. . . .  I join with Boerhave, Dr Whytt, who after taking
much pains in his Vital Functions, to prove the Existence of a Sentient Principle. .  . thinks that 
all our Motions are directed by a Physical Necessity.” (NLS Cullen, fol. 76).
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versy”—the question whether the mind volimtarily directs the vital and 
natural motions of the body. At the beginning of his lectures on the 
nervous system, he said he was following Gaub in subscribing to a 
compromise between the view of Boerhaave and Whytt on the one hand 
and that of the Stahlians on the o t h e r . T o  imderstand this we must 
examine his mental geography of volition—that is, his account of the 
extent and manner in which the mind can be said to have control over our 
bodies.
In proposition 119, Cullen listed seven causes of the action of the brain 
in bringing about changes in the body, five of which are said to be 
“modes of volition” (NLM, III, fol. 49). These include the operation of 
the will in performing voluntary actions, the passions, imitation, 
appetites directed to external objects, and propensities to remove an 
uneasy sensation. In arguing that “some Volition is concerned” in the 
last of these, Cullen gave an idea of just what he meant by ‘volition’. A 
typical case of a propensity which arises from an “uneasy sensation” is 
the voiding of urine and faeces. In such cases the relevant motions “can 
often be prevented by another volition presenting itself ”, and we can put 
forward greater or less effort in exercising them {Institutions^ H9-5)-
The Excretion of Urine is often very urgent, yet a Lady in company with men 
will restrain this Propensityj neither will a well bred Man expel wind by the 
Anus in company with Ladies; he can restrain it. . . .  [A] Man in going to Stool 
..  .in pressing out Faeces.. .holds his Breath in order to give a greater Effort, & 
if it is still more difficult, he grins most horridly. (NLS Cullen, fol. 152)
The number of muscles which come into play is determined by the 
degree of effort which is put forth (NLM, II, fols. 271-2). While Cullen 
did not deny that motions from an uneasy sensation are sometimes 
caused without any volition—that is, without the ability to do otherwise 
or to put out greater or less effort—the paradigm is those in which some 
volition is involved. In contrast, we should remember that Whytt 
postulated a sentient principle to explain those involuntary motions of 
the body which, according to him, were necessarily determined by the 
uneasy sensation.
Volitions, in Cullen’s wide sense, constantly affect our vital functions. 
While the basic motions of my heart and lungs are carried out purely 
mechanically, they are constantly affected by my passions, i.e. “more 
general and vehement volitions” {Institutions, 119.2). There is “nothing 
more evident than that the passions of the mind affect the motion of the
^  NLS Cullen, fols. 76-7. For Gaub’s views on mind and body see L. J. Rather, Mind and 
body in eighteenth-century medicine (Berkeley 1965). Rather stresses the difference between 
Gaub’s view of the passions and that of Descanes. For Gaub,like Ponerfield and Cheyne, they 
are actions of the mind. This view seems to be shared by Cullen.
heart”—for example, anger will produce a violent beating of the heart 
and grief will slow it down (NLM, II, fol. 274). Though Cullen 
considered the passions to be “modifications of the will” , he noted that 
they are generally instinctive in so far as they arise directly in response to 
a certain sensation. When we are angry, even the outward motions of our 
bodies often arise without our having much awareness of them. 
However, Cullen also stressed that when our passions are not too violent 
we have some degree of conscious control over the relevant motions.
But it is not only those volitions which are essentially instinctive which 
affect our vital motions i some are also constantly affected by what are 
clearly volimtary actions. Cullen wrote that “there is no proof of any one 
muscle of the body being more under the power of the will, than the 
action of respiration” (NLM, II, fol. 273). The rate and manner of my 
breathing is affected by a number of my voluntary actions, including 
talking. Does this not mean that Cullen followed Porterfield and the 
Stahlians in holding that we have voluntary control over the vital and 
natural motions of our bodies?
Cullen’s mental geography of the will consisted of two elements, both 
basically Cartesian. First, he held that the will is a mode of thought and 
that what we will is only that which we are immediately conscious of 
willing.®  ^In bodily motions subjected to the will “the Mind only wills an 
End.. . . We know nothing of the particular muscles put in action. When 
I bend my arm, I commonly only attend to the contraction of the Biceps, 
but Winslow has shewn that many other Muscles partake in that Action” 
(NLS Cullen, fol. 161: cf. Institutions, prop. 119.1). Cullen denies that 
we have anything but a very limited and general consciousness of the 
parts of our bodies moved, and draws the conclusion that we will only the 
general movements of a limb or muscle.
Related to this is his second Cartesian principle, that “ in the moral 
Administration of the System only a general end or purpose is in view, & 
the Almighty Creator has connected certain Motions with the Volition of 
these Ends” (NLS Cullen, fol. 161; my italics). Thus there are certain 
motions of our body naturally or originally connected with the willing of 
certain general goals or purposes. To take Descartes’ own example, “if 
we want to adjust our eyes to look at a far-distant object, this volition 
causes the pupils to grow larger” {PWD, vol. i, p. 344). I cannot directly 
will the bodily motions, but only certain general conscious aims to which 
they are naturally joined. Both Descartes and Cullen held that through 
custom and habit these original connections of ideas and bodily motions
For Descartes’ view see PWD, vol. 2, p. 113, Def. I .  This new translation of Descartes’ 
works unhelpfully translates the Latin 'immediate conscii sumus’ by ‘we are immediately aware’. 
As McRae and Rodis-Lewis (note 16 above) show, Descartes was using ‘conscii’ in a new and 
important way which became fundamental in modern philosophy.
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could be changed so that the willing of a quite different idea could bring 
about the relevant bodily change.
From these two principles Cullen concluded that, while my passions 
or even my voluntary actions affect the vital motions, it is not in the way 
that the Stahlians thought. In general, we do not directly will the 
motions of individual muscles, nor do we have any distinct conscious­
ness of bodily sensations. While he accepted Porterfield’s and Perrault’s 
claim that the uniform motion of our eyes was originally voluntary 
(NLM, II, fols. lo i - i  I ; cf. Institutions, prop. 55), he did not accept that 
certain motions of muscles were chosen over others in order to achieve 
the goal of forming a distinct image of the object. Rather, it was merely 
by willing the general end of seeing objects distinctly that the motions of 
the muscles became uniform. Moreover, most of us have, through 
custom and habit, come to perform this action completely without 
consciousness, and hence the mind is no longer involved in it (NLS 
Cullen, fol. 153).
Cullen held that many motions which we may consider to be 
involuntary, including vital and natural ones, are not entirely so. But he 
showed exactly how such motions can be a matter of voluntary and 
rational choice. In his 1772 lecture on proposition 119, Cullen told his 
students that he differed from other physiologists with regard to “the 
extent of the powers of the mind or with regard to the manner of acting” . 
He distinguished the question whether the visceral motions are affected 
by the mind from the question whether they are “directed” by the mind. 
Consideration of the passions and unintended effects of voluntary 
actions shows that the motions of our internal organs are constantly 
affected by the mind. However, like Porterfield and Cheyne, Cullen held 
that vital motions such as those of the heart can be “directed by the 
mind”, though for him it is only “in one limited sense'’' (NLM, II, 
fol. 287). The mind controls the body through conscious rational choice. 
The question is how, through conscious choice of a certain means to end 
relation, we might be able to control the motion of our heart and other 
internal organs.
■ Cullen maintained that when we are calm we have some control over 
our passions through imagination, and that in so far as the passions are 
voluntary both these and the internal motions of our bodies are also 
under our control. Clearly, we can under certain circumstances control 
our passions by directing our thoughts in a certain way—that is, by 
choosing to think of certain objects with which our passions are naturally 
joined. We have “a power whereby we can recall these objects that give 
us anger or fear” . Cullen recalled that
There is a famous instance of Colonel Townshend by Dr. Cheyne who stopped 
his heart at pleasure and died when he thot proper. I can explain it. . . . By
John P. Wright
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recollecting an object of fear we can diminish its action, and [by some such way 
as this] Colonel Townshend had power over his heart. So have no doubt that we 
can by recalling one or other of these passions make it voluntary, and if you will a 
certain end, it has the power of exciting a variety of actions and combining these 
together, at the same time the heart.
Thus the mind can control the motion of the heart. Cullen’s idea is that 
Townshend was able to do it, not by directly desiring that his heartbeat 
should decrease in frequency, but rather by calling up certain thoughts 
which have that result. He suggested that perhaps “that power might 
have been greater and <been> destroyed by repetition” . Apparently he 
thought that many of us have lost the power of controlling our passions 
and the related motions of our bodies by calling up certain ideas. He 
concluded that “the heart itself is not clearly separated by the voluntary 
motions in a certain view of it” (NLM, II, fols. 273-5).
This clearly does not mean that Cullen sided with Porterfield and the 
Stahlians on either the manner or the extent of the mind’s control over 
the body. He limited such control to our conscious choice, and while, 
apart from such choice, the motions of the body are affected by the mind, 
they are not voluntary. Earlier Cullen did consider the possibility that all 
actions of our internal organs may originally have been voluntary like the 
motions of our eyes, and only became automatic through custom and 
habitj but he argued that this is improbable, given that in adults an 
internal organ can react to new stimuli without their being in any way 
conscious of it or requiring any process of habituation. Moreover, the 
kind of control which Cullen envisioned over our internal organs is only 
of the most general kind—not involving a choice of the operation of 
specific muscles. This is essentially what was proposed in section 45 of 
Descartes’ Passions of the Soul:
Our passions, too, cannot be directly aroused or suppressed by the action of our 
will, but only indirectly through the representation of things which are usually 
joined with the passions we wish to have and opposed to the passions we wish to 
reject. For example, in order to arouse boldness and suppress fear in ourselves, it 
is not sufficient to have the volition to do so. We must apply ourselves to consider 
the reasons, objects, or precedents which persuade us that the danger is not 
great. {PWD, vol. i, p. 345)
Descartes himself had recognized the importance of such control of our 
passions for health and disease in his correspondence with Princess 
Elizabeth.®® But both Cullen and Descartes, because they limit the
“  Descartes to Elizabeth, May or June 1645, Oeuvres de Descartes, vol. 4, pp. 218-22. 
Theodore Brown, in ‘Descartes, dualism, and psychosomatic medicine’ (in The anatomy of 
madness, ed. W. F. Bynum and others, vol. i (London 1985), at p. 52), implies that Descartes 
cannot consistently hold that the mind can affect the passions. Brown is certainly correct that 
Descartes considered the passions themselves to arise directly from somatic states, but it is also 
consistent with the central principles of his philosophy that Descartes gives the mind an indirect 
control over the passions.
mind’s operations to those of which we are conscious, have a more 
limited conception of the mind’s control over the body than did 
Porterfield, Perrault, and the Stahlians.*^
Still, we may want to ask whether, in admitting that the mind can act 
independently of sensation in voluntary action (NLS Cullen, fol. 78), 
Cullen was not allowing with Porterfield and Whytt that it has special 
active powers not possessed by inanimate matter. Indeed, at the 
beginning of his 1772-73 lectures Cullen said that he did not want to 
deny that “the soul has a power of beginning motion” (NLM, II, 
fol. 35). He later noted that “Causes that in no part of nature have any 
tendency to excite motion—but rather diminish it . . . are frequent 
Causes of it in animal bodies” (fol. 280). (He claimed that when a 
depressant drug such as opium is given, sometimes the brain is excited 
instead of relaxed by it.) He regarded the healing power of nature itself as 
a kind of active power in the animal economy (fol. 276-80). Neverthe­
less, there are good indications that Cullen thought that such properties 
resulted from a certain kind of matter, not from a substance entirely 
immaterial.®* While he was very cautious in putting forward a theory of 
animal electricity, he admitted that his important neurophysiological 
concepts of “excitement and collapse” first occurred to him when he was 
formulating a “Theory” from “an Analogy I observed in the Phaeno- 
mena of electricity” (NLS Cullen, fol. 185). There is reason to think 
that, like Hume, Cullen asked himself whether “it is more difficult to 
conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from 
volition?” (E. 73). And like Hume, he appears to have answered by 
speculating on the possibility of an active matter.®^
In general, we can conclude that Cullen provided a solution—within 
the context of a Cartesian metaphysic—to the function dualism which 
we foimd so clearly expressed in Boerhaave. Like Boerhaave, Cullen
It is tempting to think of Cullen’s account as providing an explanation for a crude form of 
what today we would call “biofeedback” . But for Cullen, like Boerhaave, we never have 
anything but a general sensation of the motions of the heart and other internal organs. Modern 
biofeedback phenomena appear to require continuous information about very specific changes 
in the condition of the body (G. Jones, Visceral learning (New York 1973)). Moreover, it is 
difficult to see how such phenomena could be explained on Cullen’s Cartesian model of the will, 
which is based on the notion of an original correlation between the willed idea and the body 
motions.
In stating the point in this way I have in mind Cullen’s discussion in his lectures on the 
history of chemistry: “Aether and Inert matter are hence supposed to be the oply matters in 
nature” (RCPE, MS. Cullen 10(1), fol. 87).
On Hume’s comments on the aether hypothesis see my Sceptical realism of David Hume 
(note 30 above), pp. 145, l6lff.; also Christie, in Conceptions of ether (note 58 above). In his 
1772-73 physiology lectures Cullen became very defensive about his claims regarding animal 
electricity (NLM, III, fols. 15-19), probably in response to the attack on his student G. R. 
Brown’s dissertation in the article on Aether in the first edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
See R. K. French, ‘Aether and physiology’, in Conceptions of ether, at p. 118.
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maintained that the basic life functions are carried out independently of 
the mind. He argued that in one sense the visceral organs are constantly 
influenced by the mind, though their activity is not voluntarily willed; 
this influence is clearest in the case of the passions. But Cullen also 
argued that to a limited degree our corporeal functions can be voluntarily 
controlled by the mind—that is, by imagining certain objects which are 
naturally and habitually conjoined with our passions. Thus, while 
Cullen held that there is a basic dualism between mental functions on the 
one hand and vital and natural ones on the other, he also showed the 
nature of the causal relation between them. This causal interaction 
cannot, according to Cullen, be described in mechanical terms, since 
descriptions of mental processes are not in practice reducible to physical 
ones.’® Thus, in Cullen’s physiology, unlike that of Boerhaave, it was 
essential to discuss the conditions of mind conducive to life and health.’'
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But such a reduction appears to be possible in principle. In his 1770 lectures, Cullen wrote 
against the Stahlians that “the force of impression is every where absolute; & it is according to 
the force of impression, and other mechanical conditions of the System, that the motions 
excited prove either salutary or pernicious” (NLS Cullen, fols. 159-60).
”  This paper was written in 1986-87 while I was a visiting member of the Institute for 
Advanced Study (Princeton) and received a Grant-in-Aid from the Institute. I am grateful to 
my colleagues in the School of Historical Studies—especially to Professor Morton White—for 
their support. I am indebted to Roger Emerson, Ed Reed, M. A. Stewart, Paul Wood, and John 
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